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INTRODUCTION

Since the case of Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Fowler1
was decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court some twenty-seven years
1. 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss2/7

2

Smith: Understanding the Tort of Third-Party Bad Faith in Wyoming: Weste
1991

THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH IN WYOMING

ago, the duty of liability insurers to settle claims asserted against their
Wyoming policyholders by third parties has been clearly established,
even though 2such a duty may not be found anywhere in the contract
of insurance.
A violation of this duty is commonly referred to as "third-party"
bad faith.' Unlike "first-party" bad faith,4 which arises when insurers
refuse to pay contract benefits directly to their insureds without a
"fairly debatable" basis for such refusal, an action for "third-party"

2. The author has yet to review a liability policy of any type in which a liability
insurer has contractually assumed a duty to settle. In the research that was undertaken for this article, moreover, only one case was discovered where the liability insurer's duty to settle was expressly addressed in the contract. In Georgia Life Ins. Co.
v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646, 647 (1917), a liability insurer
addressed its duty to settle by inserting the following provision in its contract of insurance: "It is further agreed and understood that when the company has the opportunity
to settle the claim of any [third-party] within the limit designated in this policy, viz.
five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), and fails to take advantage of such opportunity ....
[the insurer] shall thereafter protect the [insured] from any judgment not in excess of
ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) ...." Presumably, the insurer in this case evaluated
the risk and cost of judgments in excess of policy limits and factored this analysis into
its rating structure. In any event, this provision has been endorsed by the California
Supreme Court in Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957) and the Oregon Supreme Court in Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Or.
1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956), as an acceptable method of dealing with the question of who
should bear the burden of a judgment entered in excess of policy limits when an opportunity existed to settle the claim within the limits of the policy.
3. As defined by one authority, "third-party" insurance is liability insurance characterized by the following:
It always involves a claim of loss and three distinct parties: an injured claimant,
an insured, and the insured's insurance company. In contrast to first-party insurance, which applies to the insured's own claimed losses, third-party insurance is
intended to protect the insured from the expense of defending and paying the
claim of a third party within the policy's limits.
D. WALL, LITIGATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 3.01, at 20 (1985) (footnotes
omitted).
Many of the text writers also characterize a liability insurer's breach of its duty to defend as "third-party" bad faith, e.g., W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD
FAITH LITIGATION

§§ 3.20-.28 (1984) [hereinafter

SHERNOFF],

even though an insurer's bad

faith refusal to defend seems to be determined by standards applicable to "first-party" bad
faith. See, e.g., Lund v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 797 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1986). In any
event, the law of bad faith as it pertains to an insurer's duty to defend is beyond the scope
of this article, except insofar as an insurer's refusal to defend also causes the insurer to
reject a settlement offer within policy limits. See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
4. Examples of "first-party" insurance contracts in which the insurer promises to
pay certain benefits directly to the insured are life insurance, health and accident insurance, comprehensive, collision, uninsured motorists and medical payments coverages in policies providing automobile insurance, title insurance, property insurance
and homeowner's insurance. See SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 5.01, at 5-3.
5. The phrase "fairly debatable" was adopted by the court in McCullough v.
Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990), to describe the standard which applies to determine whether a first-party insurer has committed bad faith. In the author's view, the adoption of this phrase was unfortunate for reasons expressed in the
first segment of this article. See Smith, Understanding the New Tort of First Party
Bad Faith In Wyoming: McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Company, 26 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 225, 253 (1991). In any event, the precise standard adopted by McCullough consists of the following two-part test: "To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff
must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the
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bad faith can be prosecuted by an insured only against his liability
insurer for failure to exercise good faith in settling claims asserted
against the insured by third parties. If a liability insurer knowingly or
recklessly fails to give equal weight to the interests of its insured in
rejecting a policy limits settlement offer,8 the insurer will be held liable for (a) any resulting judgment against the insured in excess of policy limits; (b) consequential damages; and (c) where
willful and wan7
ton behavior is established, exemplary damages.
This article was written as a corollary article to Understanding
the New Tort of First-party Bad Faith in Wyoming: McCullough v.
Golden Rule Insurance Company,' for several reasons. First of all, in
view of the recent adoption by the Wyoming Supreme Court of the
tort of first-party bad faith in McCullough, it is critically important
for the Wyoming practitioner who becomes involved in a bad faith
case to recognize and clearly distinguish between the two causes of
action. Because the elements and nature of the two causes of action
are distinctly different,0 so are the standards used to determine
whether insurers have committed acts of first-party and third-party
bad faith. Thus, the practitioner who evaluates a third-party bad faith
case on the basis that the insurer's refusal to settle was "fairly debatable" 10 may be making a mistake as potentially fatal as that made by
defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860.
6. See infra notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 278-308 and accompanying text. It should be noted that not
every judgment in excess of policy limits, even where the insurer had the opportunity
to settle within policy limits, will result in a finding of third-party bad faith.
8. Smith, Understanding the New Tort of First Party Bad Faith In Wyoming:
McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Company, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 225 (1991).
9. Compare the elements of the first-party bad faith cause of action, supra note
5, with the elements of the third-party bad faith cause of action; see infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
10. The Arizona Supreme Court has recently held in Clearwater v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 260, 792 P.2d 719, 723 (1990), that a first-party,
"fairly debatable" instruction is improper in a third-party bad faith claim based upon
an insurer's refusal to accept a settlement offer within policy limits. In support thereof,
the court explained:
Thus, an insurer owes its insured the same duty of good faith and fair dealing
in both first- and third-party actions. [citations omitted] The standard for determining whether the insurer has breached its duty, however, is different in the two
types of cases because of the different relationships and duties that exist between
the parties. In third-party actions, the insurer exclusively controls settlement and
the insured bears a disproportionate share of the risk if the insurer fails to accept
a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits. The insured faces personal liability for an award exceeding policy limits, while the insurer's potential liability
remains constant at policy limits. Therefore, although the "fairly debatable" standard sufficiently protects both parties' interests in first-party actions, it inadequately protects the insured's interests in third-party actions.
Id.
Thus, the court's basis for refusing to give a "fairly debatable" instruction in a thirdparty case was the fact that it would give undue weight to a single factor, whereas a determination of whether the insurer gave "equal consideration" to the interests of the insured in
refusing to settle within policy limits requires a consideration of several factors. Id. Unfortunately, other courts have applied a "fairly debatable" standard to determine whether a lia-
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his counterpart who determines that an insurer is guilty of first-party
bad faith because it failed to give the same consideration to the interests of its insured as it did to its own.'" This may become particularly
are offered
confusing when "third-party" and "first-party" coverages
2
in the same policy of insurance, as they often are.'
Second, Fowler unfortunately does not articulate any helpful
standards for determining when the actions of a liability insurer cross
3
the often uncertain line between good faith and bad faith,' nor does
Fowler address a multitude of other questions which the prosecution
or defense of a third-party bad faith claim necessarily entails. Indeed,
a defense attorney who reads the decision hoping to advise a liability
insurer when it may safely reject a policy limits offer in Wyoming will
find that Fowler lends little, if any, assistance. Likewise, the plaintiff's
attorney in Wyoming who looks to Fowler for guidance in advising an
insured whether to reject the insurer's defense and settle the action
directly with the third-party claimant because his or her insurer has
violated its duty to settle will find it necessary to refer to other
sources and authorities. It should be noted, however, that the failure
of Fowler to respond to such questions is not the result of an analytically deficient opinion. To the contrary, the issues on appeal in Fowler
simply did not lend themselves to a comprehensive treatment of the
subject of third-party bad faith. As a matter of fact, the only issues
raised on appeal by the appellant insurer in Fowler were (1) whether
the evidence was sufficient to show a bad faith refusal to settle and ,(2)
whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition
of bad faith.' For purposes of the appeal, in other words, both litigants assumed that a cause of action for third-party bad faith existed
in Wyoming before it was ever established at the appellate level.
Third, even though Fowler was decided long ago, it represents the
only case law in Wyoming on the subject of third-party bad faith.'"
bility carrier has acted in bad faith in rejecting a settlement offer within policy limits. E-g,
Calenda v. Allstate Ins. Co., 518 A.2d 624 (R.I. 1986).
11. Conversely, it is clear that the "equal consideration" instruction which the
Wyoming Supreme Court approved in Fowler, if applied to first-party cases, would
result in a finding of bad faith in a disproportionate number of cases and hence would
operate unfairly to first-party insurers. A first-party insurer, in other words, could refuse to consider the interests of the insured altogether, but still have a reasonable basis
for refusing to pay a first-party claim. Unfortunately, the "equal consideration" test
has been applied in first-party cases. E.g., Davis v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 25 Cal. 3d
418, 600 P.2d 1060, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979).
12. For example, refer to "Personal Automobile Insurance Coverages" set forth in
R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL
DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, app. H, at 1116 (Student ed. 1988) [hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS]. Liability coverage for property damage and bodily injury is set
forth in the same policy form as coverages for uninsured motorists, medical payments
coverage and collision and comprehensive coverages.
13. See supra notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
14. Fowler, 390 P.2d at 606.
15. There are only two other Wyoming Supreme Court opinions on the subject of
insurer bad faith. The first, a case involving uninsured motorists coverage, is Mountain
W. Farm Bureau v. Arnold, 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1985). The second, McCullough v.
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Because the Wyoming Supreme Court has not had the occasion to further address or develop the third-party bad faith cause of action, most
practitioners in Wyoming who seek to represent a client in a thirdparty bad faith case must navigate in near darkness.' 6 The purpose of
this article, therefore, along with others expressed, will be to address
some of the more important questions concerning the cause of action
for third-party bad faith that have yet to form the subject of an appellate opinion in Wyoming.
Finally, if it was ever accurate to label "third-party" bad faith as
a less than dynamic area of the law, such is no longer the case. To the
contrary, attorneys who undertake the representation of insurers, insureds or third-party claimants will find it necessary to refamiliarize
themselves with this particular area of the law today more so than at
any time in the past.17 At least two reasons explain the need to do so.
First, the number of situations in which existing liability policy limits
are inadequate to resolve third-party claims appear to be increasing,
which in turn increase the number of situations in which a conflict
between the interests of the liability insurer and the insured may develop. This is attributable to many factors, including (1) the movement by liability insurers to build defense costs within policy limits' s
Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990), established the tort of first-party bad
faith in Wyoming.
16. In addition to a mature body of case law which establishes the third-party bad
faith cause of action in nearly every American jurisdiction, there are a number of excellent texts which provide comprehensive treatment of the third-party bad faith cause
of action, including: S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES (1984); G.
KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMAN &

H. LEVINE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH (1990)
[hereinafter KORNBLUM]; P. MAGARIcK, EXCESS LIABILITY: THE LAW OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSURERS (3d ed. 1990); J. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR
BAD FAITH (5th ed. 1990); W. SHERNOFF, supra note 3; D. WALL, supra note 3; and A.
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSUREDS & INSURERS (2d
ed. 1988). An excellent journal devoted exclusively to the topic of bad faith is Mathew
Bender's BAD FAITH LAW UPDATE.

17. To be sure, the practitioner in Wyoming, or elsewhere for that matter, is still
more likely to encounter cases involving "first-party" bad faith than "third-party" bad
faith, simply because more first-party claims are asserted against insurers than liability
claims where the total damages claimed are in excess of policy limits.
18. As stated by KORNBLUM, supra note 16, § 7:107, at 7-36:
Some liability policies now provide that defense costs are included in the coverage limits, or that such limits are reduced by the amount of defense costs incurred by the insurer.
Under such policies, the longer the case continues, the lower the policy limits
availableto the injured party, and the greater risk of an excess judgment. Arguably, this increases the insurer's duty to settle early whenever possible (emphasis
as in the original).
A typical policy provision providing for defense costs within policy limits states as
follows:
Regardless of the number of insureds under this insurance or of the number
of claims made or suits brought, the company's liability is limited as follows:
...All claim expenses shall first be subtracted from the limits of liability,
with the remainder, if any, being the amount available to pay as damages. If the
limits of liability hereunder are exhausted prior to settlement or judgment of any
pending claim or suit, the company shall have the right to withdraw from the
further investigation or defense thereof by tendering control of such investigation
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and to utilize "aggregate" limits; (2) the proliferation of "low-limit"
automobile liability policies;20 (3) the increasing cost of paying for
bodily injury and property damage claims, both from the standpoint
of defense costs and claim payments, and the tendency of insureds to
underinsure against the exposure created by third-party claims, either
by underestimating the exposure involved or through a desire to minimize premium costs. The effect of all of these factors is to decrease
the total amount of liability coverage available to the insured at any
one time relative to the damage claimed by a third-party, thus increasing the likelihood that a claim will be asserted against the insured which equals or exceeds the remaining policy limits. As a result,
allegations by insureds that their liability insurers are guilty of bad
faith in refusing to settle claims made against them within the limits
of the policy, thus exposing the insured to personal liability, will increase correspondingly.
Second, and perhaps equally important, the entire body of thirdparty bad faith law, as it has evolved to determine when a liability
insurer has acted in bad faith toward its insured, has been extended
and applied to the relationship which exists between primary liability
insurers and excess insurers.21 Frequently, a corporate or individual

or defense to the insured.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 12, app. K(1), at 1170.
19. A typical "aggregate limits" policy provision reads as follows:
Regardless of the number of INSUREDS under this [insurance] or of the number
of claims made or SUITS brought, the company's liability is limited as follows:
The total liability of the company for all damages and claims expenses because of all claims or SUITS to which this [insurance] applies shall not exceed the
limit of liability stated in the [declarations] as 'aggregate.'
KEETON & Wimss, supra note 12, app. K(1), at 1170 (footnotes omitted).
Under an "aggregate limits" policy, therefore, the insured is provided with certain limits which must be used to satisfy all claims and claim expenses during the policy term. If the
"aggregate limits" of a particular policy are $500,000, in other words, and the insurer has
paid two claims during the policy term totaling $450,000, the insured has only $50,000 worth
of coverage for the remainder of the term. Again, "aggregate limits" decrease the coverage
available to the insured and thus increase the risk of a judgment in excess of policy limits.
20. See infra notes 309-311.
21. An excess insurer may assert it rights against the primary insurer on the basis
of equitable subrogation in the same fashion that an insured or his assignee may assert
his rights against the insurer under the doctrine of third-party bad faith. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1985); Bohemia
Inc. & Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1984);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 136 Mich. App. 412, 356 N.W.2d
648 (1984), aff'd in part, 393 N.W.2d 479 (1986). See also Wall, Bad Faith Excess
Liability Actions By or Against Excess Insurers, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 311 (1981).
In Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (Cal. 1974), the court listed the
elements of an equitable subrogation action by an excess carrier against a primary
carrier as follows:
(1) The primary insurer provided coverage for a loss suffered by the insured;
(2) The excess insurer was called upon to provide a portion of the settlement or
judgment or to pay the insured for his or her liability;
(3) The insured had an existing assignable cause of action against the primary
insurer, which he or she could have asserted had the insured not been paid by the
excess insurer;
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insured will not only have purchased a primary liability policy, but
also an excess or umbrella policy, to ensure that his policy limits are
high enough to protect his business or personal assets from the vast
majority of conceivable claims which may be asserted against him.22
As a result, the plaintiff in a third-party bad faith action may just as
frequently be an excess carrier as an insured. 2 Although a small number of cases have held that the primary insurer owes a direct duty to
excess carriers to settle claims within the primary carrier's policy limits,24 it is now well settled in most jurisdictions which have addressed
the issue that an excess carrier "stands in the shoes of the insured."
As a subrogee, the excess carrier may maintain an equitable action
against the primary insurer if the unwarranted refusal of the primary
insurer to settle a claim within the limits of the primary policy results
in a judgment which penetrates the limits of the excess policy.25 Thus,

(4) As a result of the conduct of the primary insurer, the excess insurer suffered
damages;
(5) The excess insurer's damages were a sum certain; and
(6) Justice required that the loss be shifted from the excess insurer to the primary
insurer.
Id. at 1349-50.
22. A true excess policy provides higher-limit coverage identical to the primary
policy and is activated at such time as the primary limits of the underlying policy are
exhausted. An umbrella policy differs from an excess policy only in that the umbrella
policy also offers some primary coverages, such as protection against libel, slander,

false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution. See 8A
J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4909.85, at 452-53 (1981).

23. A recent third-party bad faith case emanating from the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming involved the relationship between a primary carrier
and an umbrella carrier. In Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476 (10th
Cir. 1991), the primary carrier issued a liability policy to the insured with policy limits
of $500,000. The insured, an oil drilling company, also purchased an umbrella policy
with limits of $10,000,000. Both the primary insurer and the excess insurer, after receiving notice of a third-party claim, failed to defend the insured, resulting in the entry of a default judgment against the insured in the sum of $2,865,568.13. After a jury
found that both insurers had acted in bad faith toward their common insured, the
umbrella carrier pursued an action against the primary carrier, alleging that the primary carrier's failure to defend and subsequently settle the third-party claim within
its policy limits gave the umbrella carrier the right to "stand in the shoes" of the
insured for purposes of pursuing the primary carrier in an action for bad faith. While
recognizing that the remedy of equitable subrogation was available to the umbrella
carrier under ordinary circumstances, the court upheld the trial court's determination
that the umbrella carrier had also acted in bad faith toward the insured, and hence
was barred from pursing its equitable subrogation claim against the primary carrier
under the "unclean hands" doctrine. Id. at 1485-86.
24. Although a few decisions hold that a direct duty exists on the part of the
primary carrier toward the excess carrier, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co.,
714 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d
124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1980); and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 93 A.D.2d 337,
462 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1983), aff'd, 463 N.E.2d 608 (1984), most impose the duty through
the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
25. E.g., Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.
1985); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1985); Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 699 F.
Supp. 732 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md.
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if the primary carrier receives a settlement demand within the limits
of the primary policy from a third-party claimant, the primary carrier
must, in responding to the demand, consider the interests of the excess carrier in the same fashion as it is required to consider the interests of the insured where no excess insurance is involved. 6 Its failure
to do so will render the primary carrier liable to the excess carrier in
to the
the same manner as the primary carrier is held accountable
27
insured in situations where no excess insurance exists.

II.

THE BASIS FOR THE THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION

The cause of action for third-party bad faith, or more specifically,
315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 426
Mich. App. 412, 393 N.W.2d 479 (1986); Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial
Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, 693 P.2d 1296 (1985); F. B. Washburn Candy Corp. v. Fireman's
Fund, 373 Pa. Super. 479, 541 A.2d 771 (1988). See also Annotation, Excess Carrier's
Right to Maintain Action Against Primary Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure to
Settle Claim Against Insured, 10 A.L.R.4th §§ 1-4, at 879-96 (1981).
26. In Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, 521-22,
693 P.2d 1296, 1301-02 (1985), the court stated as follows:
In the absence of excess insurance, the insured becomes his own excess insurer.
With the purchase of excess insurance, the excess insurer steps into the shoes of
the insured as to the potential liability covered by the excess policy. The rationale
was stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 8-9, 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1976):
"We hold that an excess insurer is subrogated to the insured's rights against a
primary insurer for breach of the primary insurer's good-faith duty to settle. See,
Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974). As one commentator has observed, 'In the case of excess coverage, the primary insurer should be
held responsible to the excess insurer for improper failure to settle, since the position of the latter is analogous to that of the insured when only one insurer is
involved.' R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, § 7.8(d). When there is no excess insurer,
the insured becomes his own excess insurer, and his single primary insurer owes
him a duty of good faith in protecting him from an excess judgment and personal
liability. If the insured purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess insurer for himself. It follows that the excess insurer should assume the rights
as well as the obligations of the insured in that position."
Id. (footnote omitted).
It is clear, therefore, that the primary insurer owes an excess insurer the same duty to
settle claims within policy limits as it owes to an insured. In considering the manner in
which it will respond to a policy limits settlement offer, the primary insurer may consider its
own interests, but it must give equal consideration to the interests of the excess insurer as
well where excess insurance is involved. See infra notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
27. In Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 318-20, 519
A.2d 202, 204-05 (1987), the court noted:
Clearly [the insured] would have a cause of action against [the primary insurer] for bad faith refusal to settle a claim within policy limits if it did not have
excess liability coverage....
Glen Falls overlooks, however, that its insured, Publication Press, would have
a cause of action against it if Publication Press had no excess liability policy. If
such an action were successful, Glen Falls would have to pay its insured's portion
of the judgment. Thus, if the excess carrier has no cause of action against the
primary, the primary insurance company retains whatever it would have to pay to
an insured with no excess liability coverage. Under these circumstances, Glen Falls
would be unjustly enriched if it wrongfully failed to settle the suit against Publication Press within the primary policy limits.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed upon liability insurers for violating their duty to settle claims
within policy limits, first arose in the early part of the twentieth century to combat and control abuses practiced by liability insurers in
exercising their right to control the defense of third-party claims.2 8
Liability policies are explicit and absolute in the control they give to
insurers to settle or compromise claims asserted against their insureds. In order to exert this control, the insurer need only assume or
agree to assume the insured's defense by acknowledging an obligation
to defend under the policy. A typical policy provision which grants
liability insurers the exclusive right to control the defense of a thirdparty claim, in part, reads as follows:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
We will have the
damage" to which this insurance applies ....
right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking those damages.
(2) We may investigate and settle any "claim" or "suit" at
our discretion . . . [emphasis added].29
The contractual right of liability insurers to settle cases, quite obviously, is one which is frequently exercised. It is common knowledge
that the vast majority of claims do not mature into lawsuits, and the
vast majority of lawsuits are settled before they ever reach trial. This
right is also one which is necessary to the orderly and economical defense of claims asserted against an insurer's insureds. It has been argued that if liability insurers did not assume exclusive control over
the defense and settlement of claims against their insureds, liability
insurance would not be affordable, because insureds in every instance
would require that their claims be settled within policy limits if the
opportunity existed to do so.3 0
In exercising the necessary, yet very formidable, power to settle
claims and lawsuits, however, liability insurers have not contractually
assumed any corollary duty to settle such claims and lawsuits where
to do so would protect the insured from an obvious danger of a judgment in excess of policy limits.3 1 Liability insurers, who draft their
own contracts of insurance, have not assumed any such duty because
they apparently believe it is not in their best interests to do so.3
28. One such abuse, for example, consisted of liability insurers requiring insureds
to contribute to the settlement as a condition of accepting a policy limits offer. See S.
ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:02, at 2-3.
29. See, e.g., KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 12, app. J(1), at 1149.

30. See Comment, In California Excess Liability Cases, Does "Bad Faith" in
Law Equal "Strict Liability" in Practice?, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 115, 119 (1976).
31. Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of Insurer for Refusing to Settle
Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REV. 705, 707 (1968).
32. Provided that unambiguous contractual provisions do not contravene public
policy, insurers are virtually free to insert any provisions in contracts of insurance that
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Thus, under the express contractual language adopted by standard liability policies, an insurer can completely ignore the insured who demands that the insurer accept a policy limits settlement offer," even
though the insured has a great deal to lose and the insurer has little to
gain by declining to settle. Similarly, the insurer can safely ignore the
insured who, for reasons of his own, demands that the insurer refuse
to settle a claim and take a particular case to trial. 4
The facts of Fowler, even though the case itself is a rather blatant
example of third-party bad faith, serve to illustrate the conflict which
arises between the interests of the insured and those of the insurer
when the insurer refuses to settle a case within policy limits. In
Fowler, the insured bought an employer's liability policy with policy
limits of $10,000 to protect him from the third-party claims of others,
including claims made by employees. Subsequently, one of the insured's employees was injured in a fall from a ladder. The evidence
tended to support a showing of negligence on the part of the insured
in furnishing an unsafe and defective ladder to the employer for use
during the course of employment. The injured employee offered to
settle his claim against the insured for $2,813.80, but when this offer
was refused by the liability insurer, suit was filed, in which judgment
was rendered in favor of the employee and against the insured for
$18,102.50. Thereafter, in order to avert an appeal, the injured employee accepted $15,000.00 in full satisfaction of the judgment, with
the liability insurer paying its $10,000.00 policy limits and the insured
employer paying the difference of $5,000.00. The insured thereafter
filed suit against his own liability insurer for bad faith in an effort to
recover his $5,000.00 contribution toward discharging the judgment.
In Fowler, the insurer, having assumed the defense of the claim
asserted against the insured, used its contractual power and right to
settle cases to reject the plaintiff's offer to settle his claim against the
insured for $2,813.80. In doing so, the insurer obviously sought to advance its own interest. By rejecting the offer of settlement, the insurer
hoped to resolve the claim for less than $2,813.80. s 1 By rejecting the

they deem necessary. Infra notes 312-314. The fact that liability insurers have not
attempted to define their duty to settle or the remedies available upon breach can be
rationalized only on the basis that such insurers do not deem it in their best interests

to do so.
33. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1988); Eklund v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am., 41 Colo. App. 96, 579 P.2d 1185 (1978); Peterson v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 180 Minn. 482, 160 N.W.2d 541 (1968).
34. Some liability policies, particularly those which insure professionals against
third-party claims, now give the insured the right to approve a settlement agreement.
S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:24, at 3-59. Where the insured urges the rejection of the
settlement offer because he fears that settlement may adversely affect his professional
reputation, he cannot later be heard to complain if an excess judgment is entered. See,
e.g., Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776
(1979).
35. The insurer in Fowler indicated a willingness to settle the claim for the rather
meager sum of $500.00. Fowler, 390 P.2d at 603.
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offer, however, the insurer unnecessarily caused a judgment to be entered against the insured which was $8,102.50 in excess of policy limits. The issue on appeal, therefore, dealt with whether the insurer
should be held liable for the excess judgment. Indeed, given the fact
that insureds who have purchased liability insurance, such as the insured in Fowler, have no contractual right or power to require their
insurers to accept offers of settlement within policy limits, the thrust
of "third-party bad faith" case law in this century has been to define
those situations in which a liability insurer will be held liable for a
resulting excess judgment.
The absence of any explicit promise by liability insurers to protect the insured from judgments in excess of policy limits explains
why insureds in early cases were unable to hold insurers liable under a
breach of contract theory whenever an insurer's failure or refusal to
settle resulted in a judgment in excess of policy limits." Thus, in
Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,3 7 where an
excess judgment of $2,500.00 was entered against an insured with policy limits of $1,500.00 after the insurer rejected a $1000.00 offer of
settlement, the court held:
The defendant company nowhere agrees to settle any judgment,
or to indemnify the assured against any judgment that may be
recovered against it, beyond the specified limits of $1,500 and the
cost of defending the suit. This is clearly the contract which the
parties made, and the one which they are entitled to have enforced according to its terms."
Because of the obvious inequities in a rule of law which granted
absolute immunity to liability insurers beyond the limits of the policy
when they unreasonably refused to accept an offer of settlement
within policy limits, other theories of liability soon emerged which
yielded better results from the standpoint of the insured. Indeed, actions brought against insurers for negligence, 39 fraud40 and breach of
fiduciary duty4 ' enjoyed some initial success. It remained, however, for
36. See Neuberger v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 18 Ala. App. 72, 89 So. 90, cert.
denied, 89 So. 924 (1921); Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Ind. App. 301,
115 N.E. 348 (1917); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429,
271 S.W. 444 (1925); New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153,
38 So. 89 (1905); Long v. Union Indem. Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931); Mears
Mining Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Mo. App. 178, 144 S.W. 883 (1912); Streat
Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923); C. Schmidt & Sons
Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 20 A. 653 (1914); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916).
37. 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899).
38. Id. at 588, 43 A. at 506.
39. See Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917).
40. See Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491
(1931).
41. Id.
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a New York court in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co. 42 and the Wis4
consin Supreme Court in Hilker v. Western Auto Insurance Co. 1 to

establish that an insurer's breach of its duty to settle claims within
the limits of the policy constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Thus, in Hilker, the court engaged in the
following, often-quoted analysis:
In express terms the contract imposes no duty at all a breach
of which makes the insurer liable to the insured for a failure to
settle or compromise a claim. However, all courts are agreed that
the insurer does owe to the insured some duty in this respect.
This duty is implied as a correlative duty growing out of certain
rights and privileges which the contract confers upon the insurer.
By the terms of this contract the absolute control of the defense
of such actions is turned over to the insurer, and the insured is
excluded from any interference in any negotiations for settlement
or legal procedure. It is generally understood that these are rights
and privileges which it is necessary for the insurer to have in order to justify or enable it to assume the obligations which it does
in the contract of insurance. So long as the recovery does not exceed the limits of the insurance, the question of whether the
claim be compromised or settled, or the manner in which it shall
be defended, is a matter of no concern to the insured. However,
where an injury occurs for which a recovery may be had in a sum
exceeding the amount of the insurance, the interest of the insured
becomes one of concern to him. At this point a duty on the part
of the insurer to the insured arises. It arises because the insured
has bartered to the insurance company all of the rights possessed
by him to enable him to discover the extent of the injury and to
protect himself as best he can from the consequences of the
injury.""
The specific cause of action for third-party bad faith established
by Hilker is now recognized in some form in every American jurisdiction but one."5 However, the elements of the third-party bad faith
cause of action, including methods of determining whether an insurer
has violated its duty to settle, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The following section of this article examines the various elements as
enunciated by the courts, with particular emphasis on the standard
for determining when an insurer has violated its duty to settle as
adopted by Fowler.

42. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
43. 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
44. 235 N.W. at 414.
45. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:04, at 2-7. Mississippi alone appears to deny any
cause of action absent conduct equivalent to fraud. See Nichols v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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ELEMENTS OF THE THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION

It is often said that the elements which the insured must ordinarily plead and prove in order to establish a third-party bad faith cause
of action against a liability insurer are the following: (1) assumption of
the defense by the insurer; (2) an opportunity on the part of the insurer to settle within policy limits; (3) a "bad faith" refusal to settle
on the part of the insurer; and (4) a resulting judgment against the
insured in excess of policy limits."
The above "elements" of the third-party action, however, are not
entirely without controversy or exception. As will be seen below, for
example, it may not be necessary for the insurer to assume the defense before it can be found liable for violating its duty to settle. A
liability insurer, moreover, may be found liable for third-party bad
faith even if it never receives a settlement offer from the third-party
claimant. The standards for determining whether a liability insurer
has acted in bad faith vary from simple negligence to conduct which is
equivalent to fraud. Finally, as will be seen below, it is possible for an
insurer to incur liability for failure to settle within policy limits even
though the insured has no assets with which to pay the judgment.
A. Accepting defense of the claim-must the liability insurer actually assume the defense before it can be held liable for rejecting a
settlement offer?
Ordinarily, an insurer must assume the defense of a claim before
it has any obligation to settle claims within policy limits.'7 Unless the
insurer actually undertakes the defense of a claim, it has not reserved
unto itself the exclusive right to settle the claim, which is the basis
upon which the duty to consider the insured's interests arises."8
There is one situation, however, where a liability insurer may be
held liable for a judgment in excess of policy limits even though the
defense of a third-party claim was never undertaken or assumed by
the insurer. Frequently, a settlement offer within policy limits is received by a liability insurer who has erroneously determined that it
has no obligation to defend its insured.' After declining to undertake
46. See KORNBLUM, supra note 16, §§ 7:39 & 7:57.6, at 7-11 to 7-18. See also W.
SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 3.05.

47. See 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 51:3, at 381-85 (rev. ed. 1982) and A. WINDT,
supra note 16, § 5.06, at 196.
48. See supra note 46.
49. Wyoming adheres to the general rule that an insurer's duty to defend is
broader than its duty to indemnify. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Lythgoe, 618 P.2d 1057, 1061
(Wyo. 1980). Because an insurer must defend an action if there is the potential of
liability under its policy, it has a duty to defend actions that may not ultimately result
in an obligation to indemnify. Id. at 1061-62. In other words, just because a liability
insurer may ultimately establish that a third-party claim which it was called upon to
defend did not fall within the coverage of the policy does not mean it did not have a
duty to defend the very same claim. The failure on the part of many liability insurers
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the defense of the claim asserted against its insured, the insurer will
usually reject offers of settlement because of its belief in the absence
of coverage for the loss. Subsequently, a judgment may be entered
against the insured in excess of policy limits,50 or, alternatively, the
insured may enter into a settlement agreement with the third-party
claimant in excess of policy limits. 5' Does the liability insurer then
become liable for the excess judgment even though it believed in good
faith that it had no duty to defend?
The majority of courts who have considered this issue appear to
have held that the insurer is liable for the entire judgment.5 2 The
leading case is Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,58 where the California Supreme Court held that an insurer who rejects a settlement
offer because it has determined that it has no duty to defend does so
at its own peril:
We do not agree with the cases that hold there is no liability
in excess of the policy limits where the insurer, believing there is
no coverage, wrongfully refuses to defend and without justification refuses to settle the claim. [citations omitted] An insurer who
denies coverage does so as its own risk, and, although its position
may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to
be wrongful it is liable for the full amount which will compensate
to differentiate between their duty to defend and their duty to indemnify has too often
led to a decision not to defend because of a belief that coverage did not exist.
50. If the insured is not being defended, he may allow a default judgment to be
entered against him if he does not have the financial resources to hire his own counsel.
The authorities are split, however, on the issue of whether the insured must hire an
attorney to defend himself against the third-party claim if he has the financial resources to do so. Some decisions indicate that the insured's duty to mitigate his damages requires that he defend himself. A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 4.16, at 132. A majority of courts appear to disagree. Id.
Counsel should note that if the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, however, and
the insured does not have the financial resources to defend himself, the insurer may be
held liable for a default judgment in excess of policy limits even though a policy limits
settlement offer is never received by the insurer. In such cases, the insurer should be
held liable for the excess judgment because the insured was not financially able to
prevent the entry of the default judgment. In this instance, the insurer's wrongful refusal to defend was the proximate cause of the insured's damage. See A. WINDT, supra
note 16, § 4.34, at 169.
51. See infra notes 253-267 and accompanying text.
52. It should be noted that if the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, but the
insurer did not have the opportunity to accept an offer of settlement within policy
limits, the insurer's liability will generally not exceed its policy limits, at least in situations where the insured was able to defend himself. As stated by Windt:
The liability of the insurer is ordinarily not increased beyond the policy limits
because it wrongfully refuses to defend the insured. In most such cases, there is no
basis for concluding that a judgment would have been for a lesser amount had the
defense been conducted by counsel provided by the insurer. As a result, it cannot
be said that the detriment suffered by the insured as a result of a judgment in
excess of the policy limits was proximately caused by the insurer's refusal to
defend.
A. WINDT,

supra note 16, § 4.34, at 210.

53. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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the insured for all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of
the express and implied obligations of the contract. Certainly an
insurer who not only rejected a reasonable offer of settlement
but also wrongfully refuses to defend should be in no better position than if it had assumed the defense and then declined to
settle. The insurer should not be permitted to profit by its own
wrong."'
Although there are a few cases which hold that the insurer's duty
to settle does not, under any circumstances, arise unless the insurer
has actually assumed the defense of a third-party action, 5 recent decisions appear to have followed the lead of the Comunale decision. 6
Yet other cases, exemplified by the New York decision of Gordon v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,57 impose liability upon the insurer
for an excess judgment only if the original insurer's decision not to
undertake the defense of the claim was itself made in bad faith. As
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in a case interpreting
South Dakota law,58 however, as long as the judgment in excess of
policy limits was a foreseeable result of the insurer's wrongful refusal
to defend, the good faith or bad faith of the insurer is not at issue. As
stated by the court:
There exists an important difference
insurer who performs his obligation
fails to exercise good faith in settling
an insurer who breaches his contract
sonable offer to settle.

between the liability of an
to defend the insured but
within the policy limits and
and who then rejects a rea-

When it is alleged that the sole breach of duty by the carrier
is its refusal to settle within the policy limits, good faith becomes
the central issue to be decided. On the other hand, good faith is
not relevant to an insurer's wrongful breach of its contract to provide coverage. A breach of contract is never justified simply because the offending party in good faith believed he was entitled to
refuse performance. When a breach occurs the basic question
then concerns the proper measure of damages which flow from

54. Id. at 201-02 (emphasis added).
55. E.g., Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952);
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972).
56. E.g., Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Blakely v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 424 F.2d
728 (5th Cir. 1970); Seward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 392 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1968); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1968); Buntin v.
Continental Ins. Co., 525 F. Supp. 1077 (D.V.I. 1981); Alexander Underwriters Gen.
Agency, Inc. v. Lovett, 177 Ga. App. 262, 339 S.E.2d 368 (1985); Jenkins v. General
Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 349 Mass. 699, 212 N.E.2d 464 (1965); Lujan v.
Gonzalez, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 501 P.2d 663
(1972); Prince v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1966).
57. 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972).
58. Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss2/7

16

Smith: Understanding the Tort of Third-Party Bad Faith in Wyoming: Weste
THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH IN WYOMING

the breach.

9

What is the significance of the above discussion to the Wyoming
practitioner? If circumstances otherwise warrant, counsel for the
third-party claimant should always submit a policy limits offer to the
defendant's liability carrier." Indeed, if it appears as if there may be
coverage"' or the defendant is otherwise judgment-proof, counsel for
the third-party claimant should investigate the possibility of acaction against the incepting an assignment of the insured's cause sof
2
surer in exchange for a covenant not to sue.
Counsel for the insurer in Wyoming should assume that the danger of the insurer being held liable for a judgment in excess of policy
limits exists each and every time a decision not to defend is made.
Indeed, since the insured's financial status is not often known at such
time as the decision not to defend is made,6" the insurer runs the risk
that an insured without the necessary resources to defend himself will
simply allow the claimant to take a default judgment against him. To
minimize this danger, third-party claims should be defended under a
reservation of rights if there is the slightest chance that coverage may
be found to exist.64 There are at least two compelling reasons to do so.
59. Id. at 1020 (footnotes omitted).
60. Supra note 52. Presenting the insurer who has refused to defend with an offer
to settle within policy limits, as discussed above, may provide the insured or the thirdparty claimant with the basis to impose a judgment in excess of policy limits upon the
insurer. Unless the insurer had the opportunity to prevent the excess judgment from
being entered, or unless the insurer caused the insured to incur the excess liability in
some other way, such as where a default judgment was entered because the insured
could not afford to hire his own attorney, the insurer's liability will generally be restricted to its policy limits.
61. Counsel should note that where the settlement offer is rejected by the insurer
who has wrongfully refused to defend, the plaintiff in a subsequent bad faith action
does not have to prove that the rejection of the settlement offer was in bad faith in
order to recover an excess judgment from the insurer. Rather, he must prove only that
the third-party claim fell within the coverage of the policy. See Steil v. Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), where the court
rejected the argument that the plaintiff's burden should only have to show the "potential" for coverage in order to recover on the theory that the insurer breaches its duty
to defend if there was a possibility of coverage. Instead, the court held that coverage in
fact must be established.
In spite of some limited authority to the contrary, counsel representing the insured or his assignee should argue that where the insurer refuses to defend, and thus
does not take advantage of a policy limits settlement offer, a resulting judgment in
excess of policy limits was proximately caused by the insured's breach of its duty to
defend, not by its duty to indemnify. Whereas the insurer's breach of its duty to indemnify can be established only by proving coverage under the policy, the breach of
the duty to defend may be established by showing only a potential for coverage under
the policy. See Aim v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962). Arguably,
therefore, the proper standard for determining whether the insurer is liable for the
judgment in excess of policy limits is whether there was a potential for coverage, not
coverage in fact.
62. See inira notes 217-232 and accompanying text.
63. Supra note 50.
64. A letter from the insurer notifying the insured that (1) the insurer maintains
the third-party's claim may not be covered under the policy and (2) the insurer does
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First, as noted by the Eighth Circuit in the South Dakota case, in
order to prevail in an action seeking to recover the entire excess judgment against the insurer who rejected a reasonable settlement opportunity because it wrongfully refused to defend, the insured or thirdparty claimant need only establish that coverage existed or, in other
words, that the insurer breached its duty to defend. 5 On the other
hand, if the insured or third-party claimant seeks to hold the insurer
liable for refusing to accept a policy limits offer where the insurer has
undertaken the defense of the claim, an unreasonable or "bad faith"
refusal to settle must be established. 6 Second, once the insurer's decision not to defend has been made, the insurer may not have a chance
to reevaluate its decision at such time as it receives a policy limits
offer. Once it is determined that the insurer has breached the contract
by erroneously refusing to defend, the insured cannot be compelled to
accept the insurer's belated offer to defend.""
Finally, the insured who is informed that his liability insurer will
not defend him against the claims of a third party should attempt to
interest the third-party claimant in accepting an assignment of his potential cause of action against the insurer in exchange for a covenant
not to sue.6 In those situations where the insured is not financially
able to satisfy a judgment in excess of policy limits, the third-party
claimant will likely be interested in entering into such an assignment.
The insured will then be protected from any further liability as a result of the suit filed against him, and the third-party claimant, who
may have been faced with the difficult task of executing upon a judgment-proof insured, has the opportunity of collecting the judgment
from a solvent defendant if it can be established that coverage did in
fact exist.
B. Opportunity to settle-can a liability insurer be held liable for a
judgment in excess of policy limits if it does not receive a settlement
offer within policy limits?
It is often said that a liability insurer cannot be held liable for a
judgment in excess of policy limits in a third-party bad faith action
unless the third-party claimant actually extended a settlement offer
not waive its right to dispute such coverage by defending the insured constitutes a
reservation of rights. "[Plrudence almost always dictates that the insurer defend the
insured and preserve its right to dispute coverage by sending the insured a reservation
of rights." S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 4:13, at 4-33.
65. Supra note 59.
66. Id. Ordinarily, it is an easier task to establish coverage, which is generally a
question of law involving the construction of an insurance contract, than it is to prove
that the insurer acted in bad faith in refusing to settle a third-party claim.
67. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 26, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737
(1973). "[Aln unwarranted refusal to defend deprives the insurer of its rights under
the policy. The insurer may not later insist on controlling the insured's defense." S.
ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 4:08, at 4-15.
68. See infra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
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within policy limits to the insured or the insured's liability carrier. 9
The basis for such a rule is that a conflict of interest between the
insured and his liability carrier can develop only when the third-party
communicates an offer to settle the claim within policy limclaimant
its.7 0 If an offer to settle is not received by the insurer, in other words,
bad faith cannot exist because the conflict which requires the insurer
to give consideration to the insured's interests never arises71
As pointed out by one authority, however, the notion that a conflict of interest between the insured and his liability carrier arises only
after the insurer is provided with an offer of settlement within policy
limits is fallacious:
In fact, however, a conflict of interest between the insurer and
insured, at least with regard to settlement, arises as soon as a
third party makes a claim against the insured which exceeds the
policy. The insured's interests demand that the insurer seek out
the third party and attempt to settle the claim within the policy
limits. The insurer's interests call for the insurer to avoid settlement discussions with the third party because a policy limits settlement offer might force the insurer to pay its full policy limits,
while litigating the case holds out the possibility, however remote,
of a defense verdict and escape from any liability beyond costs
and attorney's fees. Thus, the Merritt court mistakenly concluded
that the insurer's and insured's interests remain parallel and do
not conflict
until the third party makes a policy limits settlement
72
offer.
In line with the view that a conflict of interest between insurer
and insured arises as soon as a claim is made against the insured in
excess of policy limits, a majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue now recognize that an insurer has an affirmative duty to
initiate settlement negotiations with the third-party claimant 7 3 at
69. SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 3.05[2][a]. This rule applies, of course, only when
the third-party claimant is seeking damages in excess of the policy limits. See infra
notes 76-77.
70. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
71. Id.
72. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:18, at 3-39.
73. E.g., Texoma AG-Prods., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 755 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1985); Lienemann v. State Farm Mut. Auto Fire & Casualty Co., 540 F.2d 333
(8th Cir. 1976); Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970);
Abernathy v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967); Puritan Ins. Co. v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 586 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Tannerfors v. American
Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 141 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d
1247 (3d Cir. 1976); Self v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 191 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116 (1975);
Rector v. Husted, 214 Kan. 230, 519 P.2d 634 (1974); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 426 Mich. 127, 393 N.W.2d 161 (1986); Roberts v. Personal Serv.
Ins. Co., 12 Ohio App. 3d 92, 467 N.E.2d 257 (1983); Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, 693 P.2d 1296 (1985); Johnson v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Wis. 2d 633, 287 N.W.2d 729 (1980).
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least where it is probable that the insured is liable to the third-party
claimant. 4 In a leading case, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained the duty as follows:
We, too, hold that an insurer, having contractually restricted
the independent negotiating power of its insured, has a positive
fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a
settlement within the policy coverage. Any doubt as to the existence of an opportunity to settle within the face amount of the
coverage or as to the ability and willingness of the insured to pay
any excess required for settlement must be resolved in favor of
the insured unless the insurer, by some affirmative evidence, demonstrates there was not only no realistic possibility of settlement
within policy limits, but also that the insured would not have contributed to whatever
settlement figure above that sum might have
75
been available.

Notice that the rule which requires the insurer to affirmatively
initiate settlement negotiations applies only to those claims where the
prayer or request for damages exceeds policy limits. As stated by the
court in Hilker v. Western Auto Insurance Co., "[s]o long as the recovery does not exceed the limits of the insurance, the question of
whether the claim be compromised or settled, or the manner in which
it shall be defensed, is a matter of no concern to the insured."7 " If the
amount in dispute does not exceed the policy limits, there is no conflict of interest between
the insurer and insured and, therefore, no
77
duty to settle exists.
On the other hand, it goes without saying that if the insurer receives a settlement offer in excess of policy limits, it has an affirmative
duty to counteroffer or seek to lower the claimant's offer of settlement
to an amount which is within policy limits.7 8 If the insurer is unsuc74. E.g., Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1978); Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 2d 624, 117 P.2d 647 (1941); Fulton v. Woodward, 26
Ariz. App. 17, 545 P.2d 979 (1976); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty Co., 250 Iowa
1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959); and Spray v. Continental Casualty Co., 86 Or. App. 156,
739 P.2d 40 (1987).
75. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d
495, 507 (1974) (citation omitted).
76. Hilker, 235 N.W. at 413.
77. It should also be noted that the insurer has an affirmative duty to disclose its
policy limits to counsel for the third party. E.g., Davis v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 370 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). If the insurer fails to do so upon request, the insurer may not rely on the fact that the claimant's offer of settlement exceeds the policy limits as a defense to its duty to settle. Id. at 1163.
78. "[W]hen the claimant has offered to settle for an amount in excess of the
policy limits, some courts have held that the insurer at the very least has the affirmative duty to seek a reduction of the settlement demand to an amount at or within the
policy limits." SHERNOFF. supra note 3, § 3.05[2][b], at 3-28.3. See also Rector v.
Husted, 214 Kan. 230, 519 P.2d 634 (1974). (Even if insurer has no duty to accept an
offer because it is too high, insurer must nevertheless make a good faith attempt at
negotiating a settlement and may be subject to liability if its counteroffer is unreason-
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cessful, it then has the equally important duty of reporting its progress, or lack thereof, to the insured so that the insured may determine for himself if he wants to contribute to the insurer's policy limits
in order to settle the claim. 9
Were the issue to come before it, there is little reason to believe
that the Wyoming Supreme Court would not join the majority of jurisdictions which have imposed an affirmative duty upon the liability
insurer to initiate settlement negotiations, the only real issue being
whether Wyoming would align itself with jurisdictions which impose
the duty outright or with jurisdictions which impose the duty only
where investigation shows a likelihood that the insured is liable for
damages in excess of policy limits. 0 Indeed, one of the provisions of
the Wyoming Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act 81 which prohibits the practice of "[njot attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear" 82 could be argued in support of such a duty.
While there is little indication that the legislature intended the provisions of the Wyoming Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act to create a private right of action in favor of the insured,"3 the above provision arguably defines part of the insurer's duty toward the insured
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' An insurer can hardly effectuate an equitable settlement on behalf of its
insured in situations where liability is reasonably clear without some
contact with the third-party claimant's counsel.
In any event, counsel for insurers transacting the business of insurance in Wyoming should assume that insurers have an affirmative
duty to initiate settlement negotiations in Wyoming when claim is
first made against one of their insureds, particularly where the evaluation of the claim establishes the likelihood that the insured will be
found liable to the third-party claimant and the claimant's damages
will likely exceed policy limits.8 5 To satisfy this duty, counsel for the
insurer, after investigating the claim, should contact counsel for the

ably low.)
79. E.g., Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982). The
insurer should make every effort to make certain the insured understands the consequences of rejecting a policy limits settlement offer.
80. Supra notes 73-74.
81. WYO.STAT. § 26-13-124 (1983).
82. Id. § 26-13-124(a)(vi).
83. The Wyoming act is patterned after model legislation adopted by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. As stated in S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 9:03,
at 9-6: "It seems clear that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners did
not expect that its model act would expand the cause of action open to insureds and
third parties in bad faith cases." Most decisions which have considered the issue have
held that state unfair settlement practices acts do not give rise to a private right of
action on the part of first-party insureds. For a collection of cases, see S. ASHLEY,
supra note 16, § 9:03, at 9-8 n.13-14.

84. See KORNBLUM,
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

supra note 16, § 7:99, at 7-30. See also

WYOMING CIVIL PAT-

§ 2.09 (rev. ed. Oct., 1988).

85. Supra note 73.
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third-party claimant and ascertain the claimant's requirements for
settling the case.86 If the settlement requirements of the claimant are
unrealistically high, counsel for the insurer still has an obligation in
certain cases to attempt settlement within policy limits. Indeed, the
insurer may be found liable for bad faith in some cases if it makes no
further efforts at settlement or even if its counteroffer is unreasonably
low."' The insurer, moreover, should not categorically refuse to negotiate the settlement of any case, even where it is obvious that the two
parties have substantially different ideas about the worth of the
case.88 Finally, all offers made and received by the insurer's counsel
should be promptly communicated in writing to the insured.8 9
On their face, it would appear that the above rules of law are the
product of little more than common sense. In the author's experience,
however, the practical suggestions set forth above are known more for
their breach than their adherence. Indeed, one author has recently advocated in a national publication that all civil cases be tried." This
particular author begins his article with the following statements:
I hate settlements. If I had my druthers, I would take all my
cases to trial, and beyond if necessary. I consider settlements and
the drive toward settlement that infects the courts and trial bar
as the problem with the civil justice system, at least in Central
Pennsylvania where I practice.
Lest the reader conclude that a fool has taken up his pen, let
me state quickly that I have settled many cases and doubtless will
settle many more. In a given case a settlement before trial is the
proper defense goal. Nevertheless, I oppose settlements in virtually all my cases and view the great impetus toward settlement in
each case filed in state and federal court as wrong-headed and
detrimental to the public, to the civil justice system, and to trial
lawyers themselves.91
The philosophy espoused by the above author directly contradicts
much of the law that has evolved in third-party insurance cases and
86. Supra note 72.

87. Supra note 78.
88. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 570 F. Supp. 964 (D. Kan.
1983).
89. See infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
90. Rubendall, I Hate Settlements: A Defense Lawyer's Lament, Fos THE DEF. 11
(Feb. 1990).
91. Id. (italics as in the original). The author's thesis is that (1) settlements encourage other lawsuits to be filed; (2) settlements make the filing of other lawsuits
against the same entity more likely; (3) settlements prevent our best judicial minds
from performing the function they were elected or appointed to perform; (4) settlements reward inadequate preparation and sloppy practice; (5) settlements encourage
plaintiff's attorneys to accept marginal cases and file suit; (6) settlements undermine
the valuable innovation of alternate dispute resolution; and (7) settlements ruin "good
defense lawyering." Id.
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virtually ensures that insurance attorneys92 who specialize in bad faith
law will not have to learn another trade.
C. Determining bad faith-what consideration must the liability
insurer give to the interests of the insured in responding to settlement offers within policy limits?
As noted by one author,9" the purpose and goal of judicially developed standards by which the bad faith of liability insurers is to be
determined are to provide insurers with the guidance necessary to
know when an offer of settlement within policy limits can be rejected
without incurring liability for a subsequently obtained judgment
against the insured in excess of policy limits. Conversely, such standards should inform insureds as to when they should reject the insurer's defense and settle the action directly with the third-party
claimant. Judged by these goals, the courts have not, in adopting various standards to determine when the insurer has acted in bad faith,
materially aided either party to the insurance contract.
1.

Confusing standards

The standards promulgated by the courts to determine when a
liability insurer's conduct rises to the level of third-party "bad faith"
are, to say the least, confusing and irreconcilable. Some cases apply a
simple negligence standard in determining whether a liability insurer
has violated its duty to settle a claim within policy limits.94 It has
been held, however, that the "bad faith" of the insurer is one factor
by which a determination of such negligence can be made." Other
92. The recommendations made by Mr. Rubendall, if followed by counsel hired by
a liability insurer to defend its insured against a third-party claim, virtually guarantee
a finding of third-party bad faith. He states:
The second step is far easier. Do not mention settlement to the plaintiff's attorney. Do not make an offer until the plaintiff's attorney has made a demand. My
personal preference is to reject the first demand out of hand and to deal only with
the second demand. An attitude of breezily looking forward to trial and a complete avoidance of the word 'settlement' are the easiest and most effective ways to
convince the plaintiff's attorney that a defense verdict following trial is your one
and only aim.
Id. at 14.
93. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:08, at 2-23.

94. Jurisdictions which have adopted a negligence standard include: Colorado,
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984); Georgia, Home Ins. Co. v.
North River Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. 551, 385 S.E.2d 736 (1989); Indiana, Bennett v.

Slater, 154 Ind. App. 67, 289 N.E.2d 144 (1972); Kansas, Anderson v. Southern Sur.
Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 P. 583 (1920); Massachusetts, Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort

Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); New Hampshire,
Shaheen v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.H. 1987); Oregon, Spray v.
Continental Casualty Co., 86 Or. App. 156, 739 P.2d 40 (1987); South Carolina, Tyger
River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933); Texas,
Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
95. E.g., Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, 215
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).
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courts clearly apply a bad faith standard, but have held that evidence
of negligence is admissible to support a showing of bad faith." The
"bad faith" standard in many jurisdictions consists of a requirement
that the insurer give some degree of consideration to the interests of
the insured, 97 while in others it requires proof of subjective ill will,
dishonest purpose, or some intent to harm the insured." Among the
jurisdictions which only require the insurer to give some degree of
consideration to the interests of the insured in considering a policy
limits offer, there is more confusion and uncertainty. A few older decisions support the view that the insurer may consider its own interests
as paramount to those of the insured. 9 Others adhere to the opposite

96. E.g., Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982);
North River Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1979);
American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958);
Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285 (11th Cir. 1983); and Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987). See also D. WALL,
supra note 3, § 3.23, at 58 ("In most jurisdictions, however, evidence of the liability
insurer's negligence concerning settlement is admissible as evidence tending to show
bad faith and unfair dealing in settlement.").
97. Alabama, American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932);
Arizona, Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957); Gibbs v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1976); Easley v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Columbia Casualty Co., 174 F.
Supp. 566 (S.D. 111. 1959); Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d
30 (Iowa 1982); Carruba v. Transit Casualty Co., 443 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1971); Louisiana, Southern Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 498 So. 2d 280 (La. Ct.
App. 1986); Maryland, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315,
519 A.2d 202 (1987); Massachusetts, Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339
Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959); Michigan, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Mich. App. 381, 357 N.W.2d 861 (1984), aff'd, 393 N.W.2d 161
(1986); Minnesota, Riske v. Truck Ins. Exch., 490 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1974); Missouri,
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Montana,
Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 Mont. 74, 454'P.2d 76 (1969); Nebraska,
Hadenfeldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 Neb. 578, 239 N.W.2d 499 (1976);
New Jersey, Tannerfors v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 141 (D.N.J.
1975), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976); New Mexico, Ambassador
Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 102 N.M. 28, 290 P.2d 1022 (1984); New
York, All State Vehicles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); North
Carolina, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 325 F. Supp. 204
(W.D.N.C. 1971); Ohio, Roberts v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 12 Ohio App. 3d 92, 467
N.E.2d 257 (1983); Oregon, Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 574 F.2d 469
(9th Cir. 1978); McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 711
F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1983); Rhode Island, Voccio v. Reliance Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983); North River Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.
1979); Tennessee, Brown v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1980); Vermont, Myers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 146 Vt. 552, 508 A.2d 689 (1986);
Virginia, Swiatlowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 585 F. Supp. 965 (W.D. Va.
1984); Wisconsin, Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385
N.W.2d 171 (1986).
98. E.g., Valentine v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1980); Martin
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
931 (1973); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d
759 (1980).
99. Cases which have held that an insurer may give more consideration to its own
interests than to those of the insured include: New Orleans & C.R. Co. v. Maryland
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rule and hold that the insurer must give paramount consideration to
the interests of the insured,100 while most courts hold that the insurer
must accord the interest of its insured the same faithful or "equal"
consideration it gives its own interest. 0 ' Many courts, regardless of
whether they have adopted a negligence standard or a bad faith standard, now adhere to the "disregard the limits" test,'0 2 while still
Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362,
228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E.
577 (1923); Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance, 6
Ohio App. 344 (1917); Wisconsin Zinc. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155
N.W. 1081 (1916).
100. Cases in which the court has held that the insurer must give greater consideration to the interests of the insured than to its own include: United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809, afJ'd, 158 S.E.2d 243 (1967);
Hidalgo v. Frenchman's Wharf Apartments, 464 So. 2d 981 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980); Tyger River Pine Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
101. Jurisdictions which have held that an insurer has a duty to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured include: Arizona, City of Glendale v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 126 Ariz. 118, 613 P.2d 278 (1980); Arkansas, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965); California, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 599 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Colorado, Potomac Ins. Co. v.
Wilkins Co., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967); Connecticut, United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1972); Florida, Self v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
345 F. Supp. 191 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Georgia, Davis v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 160 Ga. App.
813, 288 S.E.2d 233 (1982); Illinois, Salvator v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 156
Ill. App. 3d 930, 509 N.E.2d 1349 (1987); Iowa, Loudon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 360 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Kansas, Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224
(D. Kan. 1978); Louisiana, Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154
(5th Cir. 1965); Maryland, Sobus v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 393 F. Supp. 661
(D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976); Minnesota, Short v. Dairyland Ins.
Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 1983); Mississippi, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988); Montana, Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210
Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984); New Hampshire, Douglas v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924); New Jersey, Board of Educ. v. Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co., 293 F. Supp. 541 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1969);
New Mexico, Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 102 N.M. 28, 690
P.2d 1022 (1984); New York, Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972);
Ohio, Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971);
Oklahoma, State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 251 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1957); Oregon,
Kriz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, 600 P.2d 496 (1979); Pennsylvania, United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1985);
Rhode Island, Voccio v. Reliance Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); South Dakota,
Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d 633 (1973); Tennessee, Coppage v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1967); Utah, Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967); Virgin Islands, Cay Drivers,
Inc. v. Raven, 627 F. Supp. 453 (D.V.I. 1986), reu'd on other grounds, 812 F.2d 866 (3d
Cir. 1987); Washington, Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381,
715 P.2d 1133 (1986).
102. Jurisdictions in which the "disregard the limits" rule is followed include: Arizona, Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 792 P.2d 719 (1990);
California, Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1984);
Delaware, McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1987); Florida, Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal v. Avila, 473 So. 2d 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Illinois, Bailey v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 429 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1970); Iowa,
Wierck v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1990); Kansas, Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 570 F. Supp. 964 (D. Kan. 1983); Massachusetts, Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338
(1959); Minnesota, Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238
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others follow a standard based upon the probability of success in defending the insured. 0 3 Finally, many courts104apply both a negligence
and a bad faith standard at the same time.
Given the judicially created lack of clarity which permeates this
area of the law, the confusion exhibited by the court in such cases as
Davy v. Public National Ins. Co. should come as no surprise. In that
case the court observed:
The refusal to accept a proposed settlement which, under all cirN.W.2d 862 (1976); New Jersey, Tannerfors v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 397 F.
Supp. 141 (D.N.J. 1975), affd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976); New
York, Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969); Oklahoma,
American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. L.C. Jones Trucking Co., 321 P.2d 685 (Okla.
1958); Oregon, Spray v. Continental Casualty Co., 86 Or. App. 156, 739 P.2d 40 (1987);
Pennsylvania, Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1960); Rhode Island,
Voccio v. Reliance Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); South Dakota, Helmbolt v.
LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 55 (S.D. 1987); Virgin Islands, Buntin v. Continental Ins. Co., 525 F. Supp. 1077 (D.V.I. 1981); Washington, Hamilton v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193 (1974).
103. E.g., California, Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564,
18 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1962); Georgia, Hall v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844 (5th
Cir. 1953); Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1978); Louisiana, Younger v.
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 174 So. 2d 672 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 176 So. 2d
145 (1965); Nebraska, Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318
(1962); Michigan, Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 496 F.2d 265
(6th Cir. 1974); Minnesota, Larson v. Anchor Casualty Co., 249 Minn. 339, 82 N.W.2d
376 (1957); New York, Mendota Elec. Co. v. New York Indem. Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211
N.W. 317 (1926); New Jersey, Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J.
1967); Oklahoma, Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 228 F.2d 953 (10th
Cir. 1955); Pennsylvania, Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1960);
Tennessee, State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 427 S.W.2d 30 (1968); Wisconsin, Byrnes v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 303 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1962).
104. States which have applied both standards include: Alabama, State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 554 So. 2d 387 (Ala. 1989); Arkansas, McCall v. Southern
Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 255 Ark. 401, 501 S.W.2d 223 (1973); Connecticut,
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1972);
Delaware, Maguire v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 866 (D. Del. 1972); Florida, Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal v. Avila, 473 So. 2d 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Georgia, McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 869, 310 S.E.2d 513 (1984); Idaho, Openshaw v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 192, 484 P.2d 1032 (1971); Illinois, National Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Continental Illinois, 673 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Indiana, Anderson v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1965); Kansas, Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1985); Louisiana, Bohn v. Sentry Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1269
(5th Cir. 1989); Michigan, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 136
Mich. App. 412, 356 N.W.2d 648 (1984), afl'd, 393 N.W.2d 479 (1986); Montana, Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984); North Carolina,
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 591
(1939); Ohio, J. Spang Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 68 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1946); Oklahoma, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. L.C. Jones Trucking
Co., 321 P.2d 685 (Okla. 1958); Oregon, Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial
Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, 693 P.2d 1296 (1985); Pennsylvania, Clark v. Interstate Nat'l
Corp., 486 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1980);
South Carolina, Smith v. Maryland Casualty Co., 742 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1984); Tennessee, Holt v. Continental Ins. Co., 440 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1971); Washington, Hamilton
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193 (1974); West Virginia, Daniels v.
Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970); Wisconsin, A.W. Huss Co. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 735 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1984).
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cumstances, is reasonable, constitutes a failure to exercise good
faith. [citations omitted] Stated otherwise, an unwarranted or unreasonable rejection of an offer of compromise constitutes bad
faith ....

On the other hand, the duty to exercise good faith is not commensurate with the duty to exercise the care of an ordinarily pru-

dent person under the same circumstances. Bad faith and negligence are not legally synonymous ....
Neither mistaken judgment nor unreasonable judgment is the
equivalent of bad faith.'

Having created a myriad of tests and standards by which the bad
faith of a liability insurer is to be determined, many authorities, as
well as several courts themselves, conclude that the resulting confusion is relatively insignificant because there is no practical or substantive difference between the two standards. Thus, some authorities

have stated that the negligence standard and the bad faith standard
are "interchangeable."' 0 6 Others state that "there is more of a difference in verbiage than there is in result,"'' 7 because the courts look to
the same evidentiary factors in either case to determine whether a liability insurer should be held liable for a judgment in excess of policy
limits.' Other authorities not only disagree that the two standards
necessarily produce the same results,"'9 but further disagree as to
which standard favors the insured. One authority states, "In theory a

jury instructed that it must hold the insurer liable for negligence
should have a greater propensity to impose liability than one instructed that it may impose liability only for bad faith." 1 0 Yet another states, "Strangely enough, more verdicts for plaintiffs seem to
emerge when the case is tried upon a bad faith theory than upon a

105. Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 394-96, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488,
492-93 (4th Dist. 1960) (citations omitted).
106. E.g., Hamilton v. State Farm Ins. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193 (1974).
107. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712, at 425 (1979).

108. See Koenen, Bad Faith and Negligence Approaches to Insurer Excess Liability for Failing to Settle Third-Party Claims: Problems and Suggestions, DEF.
COUNS. J. 179, 183-84 (April 1987). As stated by another authority:
In many cases, it seems likely that an insurer's liability will not depend on
whether the standard is one of good faith, bad faith, or negligence. Virtually the
same evidence will be presented by an insured, regardless of the standard of conduct which has been articulated in the judicial precedents, to prove the negligent
breach of duty, the absence of good faith, or the presence of bad faith. The general reaction of the jury to the evidence in a particular case about the insurer's
decision not to settle is likely to be similar, if not identical, in most instances
regardless of the standard of conduct which is applied in a particular jurisdiction.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 12, § 7.8, at 883 (footnotes omitted).
109. Different results will certainly be obtained from those jurisdictions which require proof of ill will, malice or intent to harm, supra note 98, than from jurisdictions
which adhere to either a negligence standard, supra note 94, or a bad faith standard in
which such proof is not required, supra note 97.
110. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:06, at 2-17.
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negligence theory-something like the outcome in airlines cases where
res ipsa is invoked, where the plaintiff usually loses." ''
Last, but not least, the various jurisdictions not only disagree as
to the standard to be applied in determining when a liability insurer
has violated its duty to settle, they differ as to the burden of proof
which must be sustained by the plaintiff. Some jurisdictions still require the plaintiff to establish bad faith by "clear and convincing"
proof,1 ' while others adhere to the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard."'
2.

The standard adopted by Fowler

Most of the third-party bad faith decisions, including Fowler,
have described the duty owed by the insurer to the insured as one of
loyalty rather than one in which the exercise of "due care" is required. 1 ' As a result, misconduct on the part of liability insurers has
been described in terms of bad faith rather than negligence by a majority of the courts." 5 The apparent basis for this result is found in
the relationship between the liability insurer and the insured. In order
to receive the insurer's guarantee that it will indemnify the insured,
within policy limits, against claims asserted by third parties, the insured is required to surrender his right to settle the case to his insurer. Having done so, a fiduciary relationship is created between the
insurer and the insured,"" for now "[tihe insured is wholly dependent
111. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712, at 497 (1979).
112. E.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306 (3rd Cir.
1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 235 Va. 136, 366 S.E.2d 93 (1988);
Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Wis. 2d 633, 287 N.W.2d 729 (1980).
113. One authority states that the trend is toward applying the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:05, at 2-9. See also American
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1958); General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690, 698-99
(1968); Kunkel v. United Sec. Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723, 732 (1969).
114. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:06, at 2-21 n.3.
115. The bad faith standard has received its fair share of criticism. Windt, for
example, adheres to the following view:
There is, therefore, no theoretical justification for the bad faith requirement.
It is not a component of the insurer's actual breach, and it is superfluous to a
consideration of the damages for which the carrier should be liable as a result of
that breach. Bad faith has, apparently, been considered solely because of the potentially large amount of consequential damages that can result from an insurer's
breach of its duty to settle. One court, for example, has referred to the insurer's
potential liability as a "punitive measure of damages." Nevertheless, it seems only
fair that if, in fact, the insurance company has, by wrongfully refusing to settle,
caused the insured to incur substantial damages, it should be the company, not
the insured, that should ultimately be responsible. To conclude otherwise is to say
that the insurer should not be responsible for the damages it has caused because
the amount of the damage it caused was so great.
A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 5.11, at 255-56.
116. As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in Farris v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 458-60, 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (1978):
In an action for failure to settle within the policy limits, the insurance company is
charged with acting in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney in fact representing the
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upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with claims by third parties,
the insured's best interests are protected.1 117 Because the relationship
between liability insurer and insured is a fiduciary one, the duty owed
is one which is characterized by such subjective terms as "honesty,"
"intelligence," "fidelity" or "good faith."". s
In affirming a verdict for the insured, the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Fowler thus gave explicit approval to the following jury
instruction:
[The defendant has the duty] to exercise intelligence, good faith,
and honest and conscientious fidelity to the common interest of
the plaintiff as well as of the defendant and give at least equal
consideration to the interest of the insured, and, if it fails to do
so, it acts in bad faith. 19
On the basis of the above instruction, interestingly enough, one
authority has classified Wyoming as a jurisdiction which applies both
a "negligence" and a "bad faith" standard to determine liability for
third-party bad faith. 2 ' In actual fact, however, the jury instruction
adopted in Fowler does not describe a negligence standard in which
the insured must only establish that the insurer failed to exercise
"due care" in responding to policy limit settlement offers.' 2' Rather, it
describes a bad faith standard, in which the insurer must give consideration to the interests of the insured in an "honest," "intelligent,"
and "good faith" manner. 122 Consistent with the majority view among
jurisdictions which have adopted the bad faith standard, the degree of
consideration which liability insurers must give to the interests of the
insured in responding to settlement offers within policy limits under
Fowler is that of "equal" consideration.' 23
Clearly, under the Fowler test a finding of third-party bad faith
cannot be based upon negligence alone,' although the negligence of
insured's interest in litigation. The company's interest comes into conflict with
that of the insured's while representing him; and, arguably, acting in its own interests to the detriment of the insured's interest while acting in such a fiduciary
capacity is a tort.
See also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
117. Beck, 701 P.2d at 799.
118. See, e.g., Fowler, 390 P.2d at 606.
119. Id.
120. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:06, at 2-21 n.3.
121. In jurisdictions which have adopted a negligence standard, the duty of the
insurer toward the insured in responding to settlement offers is invariably expressed as
one which requires the exercise of due care. See KEETON & WIDISS. supra note 12, §
7.8, at 883, and § 7.8(b)(1), at 880-81. This standard is one which "calls for the
factfinder to determine whether a person of ordinary prudence, in the exercise of that
degree of care which such a person would use in the management of his affairs, would
have accepted the settlement offer." S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:04, at 2-7.
122. Supra note 118.
123. Supra note 101.
124. E.g., North River Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1979); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 Cal. App.
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the insurer may be a factor in determining whether the insurer has
acted in bad faith.'2 5 While mere negligence alone is insufficient to
substantiate a finding of bad faith, however, Fowler clearly does not
adopt the bad faith standard embraced by Ohio, 126 Mississippi, 2 7 or
New York, " ' where actual dishonesty, fraud or intent to harm must
be established before a liability insurer will be held to have acted in
bad faith. In these jurisdictions, bad faith "imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty
through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of
fraud," and requires an "actual intent to mislead or deceive another." 9 Rather, the mental element required under Fowler is one
where the insurer intended to act, but not necessarily harm, the insured. As articulately stated by an Arizona court:
We disagree, however with plaintiffs' assertion that mere reasonableness is the sole standard for establishing bad faith or that
an insurer's unreasonable conduct alone is sufficient to establish
liability. For if, as plaintiffs argue, reasonableness under the circumstances is the sole standard for bad faith, the tort would simply be equivalent to a negligence action. Yet it has long been established in Arizona that negligence alone is insufficient to
impose liability on an insurer for the tort of bad faith. On the
other hand, while the tort of bad faith is often referred to as an
"intentional" tort, it is clear that a bad faith claim does not rise
to the level of a traditional intentional tort in the sense that the
insurer must know with substantial certainty that its actions will
bring particular harm to the insured. Rather, the courts' references to the "intentional" aspect of the tort of bad faith have
been largely limited to the insurer's "conscious conduct"-as opposed to mere mistake or oversight-rather than to a knowledge
of impending harm to its insured. Thus, in Apodaca, our supreme
court stated:
The "intent" required [to establish a bad faith claim] is

3d 449, 158 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), a/I'd, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980); Boston
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980); Campbell v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1974); Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 267 N.W.2d 403 (Iowa 1978); Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 102 N.M. 28, 690 P.2d 1022 (1984).
The majority rule which clearly holds that negligence is a factor in determining
whether the insurer has acted in bad faith is inconsistent with the notion that bad
faith is the product of an intentional or reckless act. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. Indeed, this rule exemplifies the failure of the courts to clearly distinguish between bad faith and negligence.
125. Supra note 96.
126. Supra note 98.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 224, 404
N.E.2d 759, 762 (1980) (citing Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187
N.E. 2d 45 (1962)).
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an "evil hand"-the intent to do the act. Mere negligence or
inadvertence is not sufficient-the insurer must intend the
act or omission and must form that intent without reasonable or fairly debatable grounds. But an "evil mind" is not
required; the insurer need not intend to harm the insured
130

Thus, the Fowler standard requires that an insurer act with an
"evil hand," rather than an "evil mind." 1 As a practical matter, this
means that a liability insurer in Wyoming will not be held liable for
bad faith if its refusal to accept a settlement offer within policy limits
was a result of mistake, carelessness or inadvertence because the act
of denying the settlement offer requires an intentional act or a reckless disregard of or indifference to the facts.'3 2 Thus, if a policy limits
settlement offer is received by the insurer but is inadvertently destroyed in the mail room, causing a judgment in excess of policy limits
to be entered, the insurer has not acted in bad faith.'3 3 If an insurer
rejects a policy limits settlement offer in Wyoming while cognizant of

130. Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 153 Ariz. 95, 735 P.2d 125, 133-34
(Ariz. App. 1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis original). To the extent Trus Joist
held that there is no legal distinction between the duty of good faith owed by an insurance company when dealing with first-party claims and that owed by an insurer when
dealing with third-party claims, it has since been overruled by Clearwater v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 792 P.2d 719 (Ariz. 1990). The case nonetheless represents good law as to the mental element necessary to a finding of bad faith in
either a first- or third-party case.
131. The three standards used by the courts to determine when first-party insurers have acted in bad faith in refusing to pay claims are identical to the three standards used by the courts to determine when a third-party insurer has violated its duty
to settle claims. In both first-party cases and third-party cases some courts have
adopted a negligence standard, others have adopted a standard characterized by malice or intent to harm, and the majority of courts in either case have adopted an "intermediate" standard which falls somewhere between the "negligence" standard and the
"malice" standard. See Smith, Understandingthe New Tort of First Party Bad Faith
In Wyoming, McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Company, 26 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 225, 251-64 (1991).
The view that actual malice, ill will or intent to harm is not required proof under
the Fowler standard is supported by the court's decision in McCullough. There the
court was faced with the task of adopting a standard for determining when a firstparty insurer has violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in denying claim payments. In so doing, the court rejected both the "negligence" standard and
the "malice" standard and, instead, opted for the "intermediate" or "objective" standard exemplified by Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368
(1978). There is no reason to believe that the standard adopted by the court in Fowler
should be interpreted any differently.
132. Koenen, Bad Faith and Negligence Approaches to Insurer Excess Liability
for Failing to Settle Third-Party Claims: Problems and Suggestions, DEF. CouNs. J.
179, 185 (April 1987). In McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860, the court held that if the insurer recklessly disregards the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, such as
where it fails to conduct an adequate investigation, the knowledge requirement for
establishing bad faith will be imputed to the insurer. Since the Fowler court very
clearly indicated that failure to conduct an adequate investigation is a factor indicating bad faith, infra note 179, it must be assumed that the element of "knowledge" may
also be imputed to the insurer in a third-party case.
133. Trus Joist Corp., 153 Ariz. at 104, 735 P.2d at 134.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 26 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 7
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVI

the fact that additional investigation of the third-party claim should
be undertaken, however, the insurer will be held liable for a resulting
judgment in excess of policy limits." 4
3.

Problems with applying the Fowler standard

Ironically, the very standard which the majority of jurisdictions,
including Wyoming, has adopted to determine when a liability carrier
has violated its duty to settle has produced the least satisfactory results and has proven to be the most unworkable of any of the standards devised to date. As a practical matter, it is impossible for an
insurer to give irreconcilable interests "equal" treatment. In considering a policy limits offer where damages are alleged to have exceeded
policy limits, the insurer must follow one of two courses of action. It
must either sacrifice its interest in reducing its own claim cost below
the amount of the settlement offer by accepting the offer of settlement, or it must sacrifice the insured's interest in avoiding personal
liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits by rejecting the offer
of settlement. By virtue of the fact that the insurer must favor either
its own interests or those of the insured, the interests of one of the
parties to the contract will not receive "equal" consideration.'
Because it is impossible for the insurer to accord "equal" treatment to irreconcilable interests, the standard adopted by Fowler suffers from another weakness, even more so than other standards
adopted by the courts. It does not provide insurers with the guidance
necessary to determine when they may safely reject offers of settlement within policy limits. As stated by one authority:
[T]he notion that the insurer should give the insured's interests
'equal consideration' has enjoyed enormous popularity; yet, despite this standard's egalitarian appeal, it is difficult to imagine a
rule of law providing less guidance to an insurer forced to choose
between its own interests and its insured's interests than one
which requires the insurer to treat the parties' irreconcilable interests 'equally. '"s
Because of the manner in which the "equal consideration" test
134. See, e.g., Warren v. American Family Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 381, 361 N.W.2d
724 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
135. Thus, in Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 323 A.2d at 508, the court observed:
Yet however much the carrier considers the interests of its insured in pondering the decision as to settlement, the moment it decides not to settle, it in effect,
however reasonably, sacrifices the interests of the insured in order to promote its
own. It is always to the benefit of the insured to settle and thereby avoid the
danger of an excess verdict. Since an insurer serves only its own interests by declining to compromise within the insurance coverage, a decision not to settle is
perforce a selfish one. In attempting to save some of its own money on the policy,
the company necessarily and automatically exposes the insured to the risk of an
excess judgment.
136. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:08, at 2-23 (footnotes omitted).
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has been phrased, the inference is created that the insurer, if it decides to favor its own interests over those of the insured, must somehow refrain from sacrificing the insured's interests in the process.
What is intended by the test, but what is not actually indicated by the
manner in which the test has been devised, is a means by which the
insurer can stand back as an impartial third party and objectively determine whether the interests of the insured can be sacrificed because
the interests of the insurer in a given factual situation are at least
equally important. Needless to say, the insurer is not well equipped to
make this determination in an objective fashion when its own interests are at stake.
The greatest difficulty in applying the "equal consideration" test,
however, is that the courts have not clearly defined or limited the type
of interests which the insurer is required, or allowed, to consider in
evaluating the likelihood that a judgment in excess of policy limits
will be entered against the insured. What action does the liability insurer in Wyoming take, for example, if it receives a policy limits settlement offer of $50,000 in a case where the insurer estimates that
there is a twenty-five percent chance that the insured will be held liable for total damages in the sum of $250,000? Is the insurer's interest
in saving the sum of $50,000, at least where the odds favor the entry
of a defense verdict on the issue of liability, equal to the insured's
interest in avoiding personal liability for the sum of $200,000 in the
unlikely event the third-party claimant wins at trial?'
The answer to this question may very well depend on what "interests" the insurer is allowed or required to consider. Is the insurer,
for example, allowed to consider the degree of financial harm the insured will suffer if the rejection of a policy limits offer results in the
entry of a judgment in excess of policy limits? If so, neither an insolvent insured, from whom a judgment cannot be collected, nor a very
wealthy insured, who can easily afford to pay a judgment in excess of
policy limits, will be harmed by an insurer's violation of its duty to
settle as much as an individual who has exactly enough assets to discharge the excess judgment. If the financial condition of the insured is
the type of "interest" to which the insurer must accord "equal" consideration, therefore, an objective consideration of the interests of insureds with moderate assets may require that the insurer protect
those assets by accepting settlement offers within policy limits. On the
other hand, a consideration of the insurer's own interests, all other
things being "equal," may outweigh the interests of an insured who
137. Note should be taken in this example that the insurer may not actually be
placing its entire policy limit of $50,000 at risk by accepting the policy limits offer,
because in many cases the insurer will be found liable for less than the amount of its
policy limits, but more than zero. In order for the insurer to have $50,000 at risk in
this example, in other words, it must be assumed in all cases that one of two results
will obtain: either the insurer will receive a complete defense verdict, or a judgment in
excess of policy limits will be entered. Quite obviously, this is not a realistic
assumption.
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would not sustain a serious economic loss if a judgment in excess of
policy limits was entered against him.1"8 Moreover, economic harm is
a relative term. Should the insured be able to argue that the potential
loss of $10,000 would cause as much economic harm to the insured
and his family as the potential loss of $100,000 would to an insurer?
Other potential "interests" raise even more compelling questions.
Can the insurer properly deny a policy limits settlement offer because
of the insurer's legitimate belief that no coverage is afforded by the
policy? Put differently, is it proper for the insurer to favor its own
interests over the interests of its insured because of the probability
that no coverage exists under the policy? Is it appropriate for the insurer to consider the personal characteristics of the insured? Should
the interests of an insured who would not make a good witness at trial
because of his peculiar personal characteristics be accorded more protection because there is more of a likelihood that a judgment in excess
of policy limits will be entered against him? Should the insurer be
required to consider the characteristics of the third-party claimant? If
the negligence of the insured is alleged to have caused the permanent
paralysis of the claimant, in other words, should the interests of the
insured be given more consideration simply because the sympathy
that a victim of paralysis would inevitably generate increases the likelihood of an excess verdict? What about the insured who intentionally
underinsures himself? Since, by purchasing a low-limit policy, he purposefully decides to assume a greater risk that an excess judgment will
be entered against him, is he entitled to the same degree of protection
as the insured who purchases adequate insurance to protect himself
from the third-party claims of others? 39 In other words, is it ever appropriate to consider the manner in which the insured himself defined
his own interests at the time he purchased the policy, or must the
insurer always evaluate such interests as of the time a settlement offer
is received without regard to the amount of coverage selected by the
insured?" 0
The insurer itself may have legitimate interests which are far
broader than its immediate interest in minimizing the cost of any particular claim. The insurer, for example, may have an interest in containing settlement costs and discouraging future claims. To further
that interest, it may be necessary for the insurer to project an image
of a company which will not negotiate the settlement of questionable
claims in order to prevent such claims from being filed in the future."' Furthermore, the insurer may have an interest in establishing
138. The insurer could make the same argument concerning its own size or financial condition. Should an insurer with minimal assets be allowed to argue that its interest in saving $50,000 is much greater, relative to the interests of the insured, than
the interests of an insurer who has billions of dollars in assets?
139. See Comment, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute?, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 120, 136-37 (1968).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 136.
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a legal precedent (such as where the liability insurer for a tobacco
company wants to establish that the warning label on cigarette packages is sufficient to warn other claimants of the dangers of smoking
cigarettes) to govern the disposition of future claims. 2 Indeed, the
insurer may want to designate a specific claim as the vehicle for overturning or modifying an existing precedent. The interest of the insurer
may consist of establishing low-range settlement values for certain
types of cases in order that the insurer may have a bargaining tool to
settle similar claims it expects to receive in the future.14 Is it appropriate for the insurer to consider such interests in responding to settlement offers within policy limits? If so, how is it possible to balance
an insurer's "institutional" interests, which have nothing to do with
the individual claim asserted against the insured, with the insured's
individual interest in avoiding personal liability?
With few exceptions, the courts simply have not addressed such
questions. One issue which has been litigated in the courts is whether
the insurer can take coverage issues into account when responding to
a policy limits settlement offer. The majority rule is represented by
Johansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau,""' where the court held that the insurer's belief that the
policy does not provide coverage cannot be allowed to affect the insurer's decision as to whether a policy limits settlement offer should
be accepted. Instead, the court indicated that the insurer should evaluate the settlement offer as if there was no doubt about coverage and
reserve the defense of non-coverage if necessary. In a separate action,
the insurer may then seek reimbursement from the insured if it
should succeed in establishing a lack of coverage under the policy.145
Another issue which has been addressed by the courts is whether
the insurer may take the insured's financial condition into consideration in responding to a policy limits offer settlement. The courts seem
generally agreed that insurers may not accord the interests of the insured any less protection simply because the insured has few assets or
is insolvent at the time the settlement offer within policy limits is received by the insured.""e Indeed, the majority rule imposes liability

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
145. Id. at 19, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294, 538 P.2d at 750.
146. E.g., Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1979);
Riske v. Truck Ins. Exch., 490 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957); Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah
2d 187, 450 P.2d 460 (1969); Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d
633 (1973); Wolfberg v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 98 111. App. 2d 190, 240 N.E.2d
180 (1968).
Insurers will not likely encounter many claims where a "wealthy" insured is underinsured. A corporated insured with unlimited assets, for example, is likely to have
adequate limits of insurance or be self-insured. See Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 477
(1966).
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upon the insurer even if the insured was deceased at the time the offer
to settle was rejected and the insured's estate was totally without assets. 147 Insurers, therefore, must assume an anomaly. In responding to
settlement offers, liability insurers must assume that the 'insolvent insured is exposed to the same financial risk as the insured who can
completely satisfy an excess judgment without insurance. It is the
likelihood of a judgment being entered against the insured in excess of
policy limits which the insurer must consider, in other words, and not
the harm which may occur to the insured if an excess judgment is
actually obtained." 8
Whether the insurer is required to ignore, or allowed to consider,
the personal characteristics of the insured when considering settlement offers is much less certain." 9 One of the few authorities to address the issue argues that the insurer is required to take into account
such factors:
In sum, those personal characteristics of the insured which
bear on the consequences of a trial on the merits of the claim and
of a resultant excess judgment are all characteristics which may
reflect that the insured's best interests lie with settlement rather
than trial. It is clearly self-destructive for a liability insurer to
refuse to settle because of an individual insured's race, religion, or
sexual preferences. However, those characteristics should each be
taken into account if they can reasonably be said to have the potential to affect adversely the outcome of the case at trial. Each
such characteristic then becomes, in conjunction with all other
factors, an indication to the ordinary and prudent liability insurer
that the insured's best interests may lie with the settlement of a
given case. Whether other factors favor a given settlement or not,
such factors as the known presence of dislike, bias, or prejudice
which may adversely affect a given insured must also be taken
147. See SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 3.07[21, at 3-39 ("Moreover, the majority and
sounder view is that the insurer can be held liable for the excess judgment even though
the insured or his or her estate is insolvent and would therefore have no assets from
which to pay the excess judgment," citing, e.g., Torrez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 705 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1982)). For an authority who advocates the minority rule,
see A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 5.18, at 215-17.
148. There is some limited authority in support of the view that the insurer's liability should be restricted to the actual harm suffered by the insured, taking into account the insured's age, economic prospects, skills, and health. See Stockdale v. Jamison, 416 Mich. 217, 330 N.W.2d 389 (1982) and Thurston v. Continental Casualty Co.,
567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989).
149. One of the few cases to address the issue is Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 323
A.2d at 503-04, where the court held:
While the view of the carrier or its attorney as to liability is one important factor,
a good faith evaluation requires more. It includes consideration of the anticipated
range of a verdict, should it be adverse; the strengths and weaknesses of all of the
evidence to be presented on either side so far as known; the history of the particular geographic area in cases of similar nature; and the relative appearance,per-

suasiveness, and likely appeal o/the claimant, the insured, and the witnesses at
trial (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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into account.180
To the extent a consideration of the personal characteristics of
the claimant or the insured affects the evaluation of the claim from
the standpoint of liability and damages, the better rule is to require
the insurer to consider such factors, whether they favor rejection or
acceptance of the settlement offer. A contrary rule would encourage, if
not require, insurers to evaluate cases in a manner which would not
accurately reflect the insured's exposure to liability and damages. The
inequity that results, of course, is that less deserving insureds will receive greater protection from excess judgments because insurers will
be more inclined to settle cases with greater exposure within the limits of the policy.' 01 Likewise, the financial interests of the insured may
be jeopardized by personal characteristics of the insured or claimant
over which the insured has no control. In attempting to defend a rejection of a policy limits offer in a third-party bad faith case, therefore, counsel for the insurer should emphasize personal characteristics
of the insured or the claimant which negatively affect the claimant's
case.
It would also appear that in considering its own interests, the insurer is restricted to a consideration of the financial risk to which it is
exposed in the event it should reject a particular settlement offer. 52
The rationale for this view is sound. The insurer who advances its
"institutional" interests by refusing to settle cases, by definition, ignores the individual interests of the insured in settling the case. As a
practical matter, however, most insurers consider such factors to some
degree in responding to settlement offers. In attempting to prove bad
faith, therefore, counsel for the insured or his assignee should attempt
to establish that the insurer rejected a policy limits settlement offer as
a result of its claim philosophy, its interest in discouraging future
claims, or any other factor which has little or nothing to do with the
150. D. WALL, supra note 3, § 3.15, at 44-45. The author, however, cites no authority in support of the above proposition.
151. This issue was addressed by the court in Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 323 A.2d
at 508, in the following terms:
Moreover the rule which permits a carrier to escape liability for excess unless
its decision to go to trial is marred by dishonesty, bad faith or negligence creates
an anomalous situation for insureds. Where a settlement opportunity exists, the
more faultless the client seems to have been the more feasibly he may be subjected by the company to a trial of the case and all the dangers it entails. In the
case of an obviously blameworthy client, the carrier would normally take advantage of a settlement opportunity within policy limits since any other disposition
would be unduly optimistic. The least blameworthy insured, however, may more
readily be delivered to face the risk of excess judgment, since a refusal to compromise a case thought to be a "no liability" case would not be regarded as unreasonable. Thus, in those cases where a compromise may be effected within policy limits the more innocent an insured appears to be, the worse position he is in and the
more he is exposed to loss.
152. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957)
("Equal consideration" requires an evaluation of the amount of financial risk to which
each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle.).
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particular claim at issue.
In short, the insurer cannot have arrived at a good faith conclusion that the insured will not likely be found liable to the third-party
claimant or that damages which the claimant has sustained will not
likely exceed policy limits if the insurer bases its evaluation upon factors which the courts will not permit it to consider. Factors which
favor the insured, quite obviously, will not receive the same scrutiny
as those which allow the insurer to favor its own interests.
4.

"Disregard the limits" rule

Widespread dissatisfaction with the "equal consideration" standard adopted by such decisions as Fowler has resulted in efforts to
develop a less confusing and somewhat more equitable standard for
determining when a liability insurer has acted in bad faith.'5 3 The
most successful product of such efforts to date is the "disregard the
limits" rule. First popularized by Professor Robert Keeton in 1954,'11
it has since received widespread acceptance in jurisdictions which otherwise adhere to the "equal consideration" bad faith standard.' 55 This
rule frames the insurer's obligation to settle as follows: "In deciding
whether to settle a claim against an insured, a liability insurer should
evaluate whether to accept a proposed settlement in the same way as
would be used by an ordinarily prudent defendant who will 'be fully
liable for any judgment that may be subsequently rendered."' 56
Thus, this rule proposes to ask the insurer how it would respond
to a settlement offer within policy limits if there were no limits, that
is, if the insurer were required to withstand the entire amount of any
judgment which may be entered against its insured. If a reasonably
prudent insurer under such circumstances would have accepted the
claimant's offer of settlement, then the insurer's failure to accept the
actual policy limits offer would result in a finding of bad faith and the
insurer would become liable for the entire amount of any judgment
entered in excess of policy limits. In the previously cited example, 5 7
therefore, where a policy limits settlement offer of $50,000 is received
in a case where the insurer estimates that there is a twenty-five percent chance that the insured will be held liable for total damages in
the sum of $250,000, '8 the "disregard the limits" rule would require
the insurer to accept the policy limits offer. A reasonably prudent in-

153. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:12, at 35.
154. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
REv. 1136 (1954).
155. Supra note 101.
156. KEETON & WmsS, supra note 12, § 7.8[b][21, at 885 (footnote omitted).
157. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
158. Under the "disregard the limits" rule, the insurer must not only reasonably
evaluate the prospects of a defense verdict, but also the total damages which will likely
be awarded in the event the third-party claimant prevails. See infra note 178.
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surer who issued a policy of insurance with no limits of liability would
not risk $62,500 ($250,000 x 25%) in order to save $50,000, particularly if the cost of defending the case is considered.' 5 9
The Fowler court makes no mention of the "disregard the limits"
rule, perhaps because the rule had not gained widespread acceptance
or notoriety when Fowler was decided in 1964. A jury instruction in
Wyoming incorporating the "disregard the limits" rule, however,
would not be entirely incompatible with the "equal consideration"
standard adopted by Fowler. The rule promotes, rather than alters,
the result the "equal consideration" rule seeks to accomplish, because
the competing interests of the insured and insurer are treated as being
held by a single entity, one which has no self-interest in sacrificing
one interest over the other. 6 0 Indeed, out of some eighteen jurisdictions that have approved of the rule,' the vast majority follow the
same "equal consideration" standard which the Fowler court
adopted. 62
This rule does not in any way serve as a "cure-all" for the
problems involved in applying the Fowler standard and has received
An insurer with the ability to absorb
its own share of criticism.'
large losses which could not be absorbed by the individual insured, for
example, is more likely to take risks in rejecting offers of settlement
which the individual insured would never take.' 6' Moreover, the rule
159. In reality, the costs of defense usually figure into an insurer's decision to
accept or reject a policy limits settlement offer. In evaluating the amount of financial
risk which the insurer is exposed to in the event of a refusal to settle, taking defense
costs into consideration is certainly permitted, if not required. Indeed, in attempting
to establish bad faith, counsel for the insured or assignee should argue, in appropriate
cases, that the insurer's savings by not settling the case would have been nominal,
particularly under a low-limit policy, because any such savings would have been consumed by costs of defense. Thus, where liability is evaluated at fifty percent, damages
are estimated at $100,000, and the insurer receives a policy limits settlement offer of
$50,000, the issue may not be whether it is appropriate for the insurer to gamble
$50,000 of the insured's assets in order to save $50,000 of its own, but whether it is
appropriate to gamble $50,000 of the insured's assets in order to save $50,000 of its
own, minus defense costs.
160. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 12, § 7.8[b][2), at 884.
161. Compare supra note 101, with supra note 102.
162. See S. Ashley, supra note 16, § 2:12, at 2-36 n.5.
163. E.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495, 503-04 (1974); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426
P.2d 173 (1967). Critics of the "disregard the limits" rule are invariably advocates of
the "strict liability" rule, which imposes liability upon the insurer whenever the rejection of a policy limits offer results in an excess judgment. The strict liability rule has
yet to be adopted by any American jurisdiction. See SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 3.03[2],
at 3-12 n.15, for a listing of commentators who advocate the adoption of a strict liability rule.
164. See Koenen, Bad Faith and Negligence Approaches to Insurer Excess Liability for Failing to Settle Third-Party Claims: Problems and Suggestions, 54 DEF.
COUNS. J. 179, 184 (1987). One author argues that because the insurer will behave as a
person of unlimited wealth and play the averages, while the insured with moderate
assets would try much harder to settle the case, the "equal consideration" standard
and the "disregard the limits" rule may produce different results. Comment, Excess
Liability: Reconsiderationof California'sBad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991

39

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 26 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 7
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVI

may encourage the insurer to consider its own "institutional" interests
to the detriment of the insured.' On the other hand, an application
of the "disregard the limits" rule solves some of the problems associated with whether the insurer should take the financial condition of
the insured into consideration when responding to a policy limits settlement offer, because the inquiry under this rule is restricted to
whether a reasonable insurer would have accepted the offer if there
were no policy limits. Absent other useful standards, therefore, liability insurers in Wyoming should utilize the "disregard the limits" rule
in determining whether to accept or reject settlement offers within
policy limits. Under Fowler, it is doubtful that any liability insurer
would be found to have acted in bad faith if it can establish that a
reasonably prudent insurer without policy limits would not have accepted the claimant's settlement offer. Conversely, the rule provides
useful guidance for the insured who, having seen a policy limits offer
rejected by his insurer, must determine whether to declare a breach of
the insurer's duty to settle and take control of his own defense or assume the risk that if he is found liable to the third party, the judgment will not exceed policy limits.
D. The resulting judgment-must the insured pay the judgment
before asserting a bad faith claim against the insurer?
In spite of some earlier authority to the contrary,' it is now well
settled that the actual payment of the excess judgment by the insured
is not a prerequisite to the assertion of a third-party bad faith action
against a liability insurer.' 67 The vast majority of courts now reject the
argument that, unless the judgment is paid, the insured has not suffered any harm as a result of a judgment in excess of policy limits
having been entered against him. 68s Arguments that point to the danger of the insured converting the proceeds to his own use if he is allowed to recover without first discharging the judgment have been
similarly rejected. 69
This so-called "prepayment rule" has been advanced most often
not because the insured is capable of paying the judgment and has not
475, 477 (1966).
165. Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California'sBad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 482-83 (1966).
166. See Annotation, Insured's Payment of Excess Judgment, or a Portion
Thereof, as Prerequisiteof Recovery Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure
to Settle Claim Against Insured, 63 A.L.R.3d 627, 637-41 (1975).
167. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:22, at 3-47 ("Most courts, however, take
the view that the insured acquires a cause of action against an insurer guilty of bad
faith as soon as an excess judgment against him becomes final and need not first pay
the excess judgment."). See also Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110
Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
168. See Annotation, Insured's Payment of Excess Judgment, or a Portion
Thereof, as Prerequisiteof Recovery Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure
to Settle Claim Against Insured, 63 A.L.R.3d 627, 637 (1975).
169. Id. at 638.
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done so, but because the insured was bankrupt, insolvent, or otherwise judgment-proof at the time the excess judgment was entered. O
In such cases the courts have generally shown little sympathy for the
insurer, '71 generally because (1) the mere existence of the judgment in
excess of policy limits constitutes legal injury to the insured, that is,
the judgment itself may impair the insured's future credit;'17 (2) the
"prepayment rule" allows insurers to benefit from the impecuniousness of their insureds; 7 s and (3) the rule encourages insurers to be
less responsive to their contractual obligations.1 7 Thus, in Farmers
Insurance Exchange v.Schropp, the court held:

On the contrary, we see no reason why the insolvency of an insured or his estate should excuse the insurer from exercising the
same good faith it would be expected to exercise, were the insured
fully financially responsible. Further, an insured need not wait
until his property is seized under an excess judgment before commencing action against an insurer whom the insured claims has
acted negligently or in bad faith in failing to settle a claim within
or not the insured has
policy limits. The action lies, whether
75
paid or can pay an excess judgment.'
IV.

FACTORS INDICATING

BAD

FAITH ON THE PART OF THE LIABILITY
INSURER

Because the courts have not been able to develop adequate standards which inform either party to the insurance contract when an
insurer's duty to settle arises, factors which evidence third-party bad
faith have usually been relied upon to determine whether an insurer
should be held liable for a judgment in excess of policy limits. ' As
170. E.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 92 (Kan. 1990).
171. Supra notes 146-148.
172. See, e.g., Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1979); Riske v. Truck Ins. Exch., 490 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1974); Carter v. Pioneer Mut.
Casualty Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 146, 423 N.E.2d 188 (1981).
173. See, e.g., Levantino v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 102 Misc. 2d 77, 422
N.Y.S.2d 995 (1979); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966);
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 187, 450 P.2d 460 (1969).
174. See, e.g., Riske v. Truck Ins. Exch., 490 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1974); Crabb v.
National Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d 633 (1973); Ammerman v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 22 Utah 2d 187, 450 P.2d 460 (1969).
175. 222 Kan. 612, 567 P.2d 1359, 1369 (1977) (emphasis added). See also
Maguire v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 866 (D. Del. 1972) and Edwins v. General
Casualty Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d 965, 397 N.E.2d 1231 (1979). There is some authority to
the contrary, at least where the insured is deceased and his estate was insolvent at the
time of the insurer's failure to settle. See Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d
433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971).
176. In Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957),
the California Supreme Court held:
In resolving the question of settlement the insurer must take into account, and
give fair and objective consideration to, the insured's interests. In deciding
whether the insurer's refusal to settle constitutes a breach of its duty to exercise
good faith, the following factors should be considered; the strength of the injured
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appropriately phrased by one court, "[i]n resolving such dilemmas the
courts have done little more than list a number of factors that may be
considered in evaluating the propriety of the carrier's decision."' 77
While none of the factors listed below constitute bad faith per se,
they nonetheless illustrate the type of situations in which bad faith
will likely be found to have occurred.
A.

Duty to adequately investigate the third-party claim

Fowler makes it clear that one of the factors which may warrant a
finding of third-party bad faith is the failure of the insurer to investigate the claim so that a determination of the insured's liability to the
third-party claimant can be intelligently made. 7 ' As stated by Fowler:
[I]t is said that evidence of bad faith is present when the insurer
fails to investigate the claim properly so as to be able to intelligently assess the probabilities. Although the investigator testified
he did not make the decisions but only reported to his principal,
the insurance company, the facts as he found them, the actions of
the investigator in failing to inquire of the injured employee
about the condition of the ladder, what she was doing on the ladder, how often she used it, why or how she fell, or how the accident happened, were not in keeping with a proper and adequate
to form an intelligent judgment as to
investigation upon which
179
the employer's liability.
claimant's case on the issues of liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to
induce the insured to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly
investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured;
the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer
to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk to which
each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured in
inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the
facts; and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of
the insurer.
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court in Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d
725, 736-37 (Mont. 1984) listed the following factors as indicating bad faith: (1) whether a
verdict in excess of policy limits was likely; (2) whether a verdict of liability is doubtful; (3)
whether the insurer has given due regard to the recommendations of his trial counsel; (4)
whether the insured has been informed of all settlement demands and offers; (5) whether
the insured has demanded that the insurer settle within policy limits; and (6) whether any
offer of contribution has been made by the insured.
177. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 876, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 523
(1973).
178. Thus, the insurer is clearly obligated to objectively evaluate not only whether
its insured is liable to the third-party claimant, but the extent of the claimant's damages as well. In Young v. American Casualty Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert.
dismissed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970), for example, a judgment in excess of policy limits was
affirmed against a liability insurer where the insurer did not interview the owners of an
insured laundromat about a slip and fall claim, did not seek to interview any employees of the insured laundromat, and failed to review relevant documentation of the insured before trial of the claim.
179. Fowler, 390 P.2d at 605. It may be proper to request a separate jury instruction on a liability insurer's duty to investigate. The following jury instruction, for example, was approved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Florida law, in
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The rationale for the above rule as enunciated in Fowler is obvious. A liability insurer cannot claim to have acted in good faith in
rejecting a policy limits settlement offer when it has not made a
proper effort to ascertain the facts concerning the extent of the insured's liability and the claimant's damages.180 However appealing
this rationale may sound, it has been criticized on the basis that an
adequate or inadequate claim investigation is totally irrelevant to the
question of whether a third-party insurer commits bad faith in violating its duty to settle.""
Relevant to the liability insurer's duty to adequately investigate
third-party claims in Wyoming is the Wyoming Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act."" This act enumerates as one of several unfair
claims settlement practices "[the refusal] to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information." 8 Again, it can be argued that certain provisions of the unfair
claims settlement practices act define part of the insurer's duty toward the insured under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
84
dealing, a violation of which may support a finding of bad faith.
There is some authority that in order to constitute bad faith, a
liability insurer's failure to investigate must have caused the insurer
to have rejected a settlement offer that it otherwise would have accepted. As argued by one authority, "[i]f a prudent insurer, knowing
all the facts, would still have rejected the settlement offer, then the
mere failure to investigate should not support an award of damages."' 81 5 In fact, however, the weight of authority seems to indicate
that a negligent investigation in and of itself can support a finding of

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1969):
[O]n the question of good faith in rejecting an offer of settlement within the
policy limits, only a decision made by an insurer who exercises diligence in apprising himself of the material facts is entitled to consideration as having been made
in good faith.
Therefore, you may consider on this question of good faith or bad faith
whether the investigation made by the insurance company was thorough enough
to permit it to come to some fair, honest, and intelligent decision regarding the
settlement opportunities in light of the then existing probabilities.
See also Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 258, 792 P.2d 719, 721
(1990).
180. See SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 3.04[4], at 3-25.
181. As stated by one authority:
An inadequate investigation, by itself, does not injure the insured. For example, if
the injured party would have been unwilling to settle for an amount less than the
judgment that was entered, the insurance company cannot be guilty of a breach of
its duty to settle. Whether it conducted an adequate investigation would not have
made the injured party's settlement offer any less unreasonable, the fact that the
insurer conducted an inadequate investigation will necessarily also be irrelevant.
A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 5.14, at 260.
182. WYO. STAT. § 26-13-124 (Supp. 1990).
183. Id. § 26-13-124(a)(iv).
184. Supra notes 81-82. See KORNBLUM, supra note 16, § 7:154, at 7-40.8.
185. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:03, at 3-4.
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bad faith."'
B. Presence of strong evidence against insured as to liability and
damages
Even if the third-party claim itself has been thoroughly investigated, a liability insurer nonetheless has a duty to objectively evaluate
the third-party claim on the basis of such investigation in an honest,
intelligent and knowledgeable manner. 187 Thus, if a liability insurer
ignores evidence against the insured as to the liability of its insured,
as well as to damage suffered by the claimant, a finding of bad faith
refusal to settle may result.' 8 In Fowler, for example, the insurer was
aware of the fact that the ladder upon which the injured claimant fell
was defective and unsafe, but elected to ignore such information in
rejecting an offer of settlement within policy limits. As a result, the
court held that such evidence provided a strong indication that the
insurer had acted in bad faith.' 89 The insurer was also aware, but
chose to ignore, that the offer of settlement consisted of nothing more
186. See Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1979);
Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 1969); Brown v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963); Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan.
1978); Board of Educ. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 293 F. Supp. 541, 545, 553
(D.N.J. 1968); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435,
443 P.2d 690 (1968); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957).
187. Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1978); Merritt v. Reserve Ins.
Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967), overruled on other grounds, Manchester Ins. &
Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976);
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1965); Cowden v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957); Perry v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 49 Tenn. App. 662, 359 S.W.2d 1 (1962); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
One authority lists the following factors as being relevant to a good faith claim
evaluation:
(1) an informed and careful weighing of the facts in light of applicable standards
in the community; (2) the strengths and weaknesses of all the evidence on either
side so far as known; (3) a careful measuring of the legal facets of the case, the
probabilities of a verdict and its anticipated range if adverse; (4) results obtained
in the past in similar litigation in the same community; (5) the experience and
capabilities of counsel; (6) whether the claimant appears to be a sympathetic witness with a believable case; (7) what sort of appearance the insured and other
witnesses will make on the witness stand; and (8) the desire or instructions of the
insured in regard to settling the case.
KORNBLUM, supra note 16, § 7:157, at 7-40.9.
See also, Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 323 A.2d at 503-04, where the court held that a good
faith evaluation includes:
[Clonsideration of the anticipated range of a verdict, should it be adverse; the
strengths and weaknesses of all of the evidence to be presented on either side so
far as known; the history of the particular geographic area in cases of similar nature; and the relative appearance, persuasiveness, and likely appeal of the claimant, the insured, and the witnesses at trial.
188. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964).
189. Id. at 605.
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than the claimant's medical bills. This factor was significant because
the injured claimant, having failed to settle his claim, would have
likely sought additional damages at trial, thus increasing the likelihood that a judgment in excess of policy limits would be obtained. 190
Thus, if the insurer either knows or should have known at the
time it receives a policy limits settlement offer that (1) the insured
will probably be found liable to the third-party claimant, and (2)
damages sustained by the claimant will probably exceed policy limits,
the insurer should accept the offer. Its failure to do so in Wyoming
will likely result in a finding of bad faith and render the insurer liable
for a judgment in excess of policy limits. " If the insurer ignores the
probability that the insured will be found liable for damages in excess
of policy limits, the interests of the insurer will not have been accorded equal consideration by the insurer. Indeed, even if the insurer
in good faith concludes that the chance of its insured being found liable is less than fifty percent, a finding of bad faith may nonetheless
result if the damage exposure to the insured was great enough. If
damages are evaluated at $1,000,000, for example, and the claimant
offers to settle the claim within the $100,000 limits of the policy, the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may require that the
offer be accepted even if the insurer believes that the chances of receiving an unfavorable verdict are only one in three.19
Fowler makes it clear that the issue of whether a liability insurer
has acted in bad faith is one which depends upon the facts known or
available to the insurer at the time the offer to settle within policy
limits was made.19 3 This is significant from the standpoint that the
insured cannot use the amount of a judgment actually entered in excess of policy limits to establish that the insurer failed to properly
evaluate the claim.' 9 In other words, the amount of the actual judgment has no bearing on the issue of whether the insurer rejected the
190. Id. at 606.
191. In Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964), the
court specifically approved a jury instruction which stated that good faith meant a
bona fide belief that the insurer had a good possibility of winning the lawsuit or that
the claimant's recovery in the lawsuit would not exceed the limits of the insurance
policy. Conversely, bad faith would logically occur if the insurer rejected a policy limits
settlement offer with knowledge that the insurer did not have a good possibility of
winning the lawsuit and that the claimant's recovery would likely exceed the limits of
the insurance policy.
192. See Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980)
and Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973). As
Ashley points out, a rule which places all of the emphasis on the probability of winning
the lawsuit and none on the amount the third party will recover in the event of a
plaintiff's verdict will produce absurd results. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:10, at 2-30
to 2-31. By placing all of the attention on the issue of liability, this means that with
policy limits of $100,000, a fifty-five percent probability of winning the lawsuit, and
anticipated damages of $101,000, the insurer should settle for $100,000, even though
the actual, average exposure of such risk to the insurer would equate to $55,550
($101,000 x 55%).
193. Fowler, 390 P.2d at 605.
194. Id. at 606.
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policy limits settlement offer in good faith. The insurer has not acted
in bad faith simply because it fails to correctly predict the outcome of
the third party's action against the insured, provided that the insurer
conducted an adequate investigation and fairly evaluated the thirdparty claimant's settlement offer.1 9
Although not an issue in Fowler, it is clear from case law in other
jurisdictions that the duty to fairly evaluate a third-party claim is a
continuing one. 96 Thus, even though a liability insurer may in good
faith determine from an initial investigation that acceptance of a policy limits offer is not warranted, it may nonetheless incur liability for
bad faith refusal to accept such an offer if subsequent events indicate
otherwise.
C.

Ignoring advice to settle

In a surprising number of situations, the issue of bad faith has
been raised where the insurer rejected the advice of its own attorneys
or adjusters to settle a claim within policy limits, 9 7 resulting in the
195. See North River Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1979); Moore v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 325 F.2d 972 (10th Cir.
1963); Frank B. Connet Lumber Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 236 F.2d 117
(8th Cir. 1956); Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690 (1968);
Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973); Rector
v. Husted, 214 Kan. 230, 519 P.2d 634 (1974); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky.
447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Younger v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 174 So. 2d 672
(La. App.), cert. denied, 176 So. 2d 145 (1965); Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959); Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb.
375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962); Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J.
299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
196. E.g., Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967).
197. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 768 F.2d 315 (10th
Cir. 1985); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 574 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1978);
Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Transit
Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968), afJ'd, 410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934); Royal Transit v. Central
Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 280 Ala. 343, 194 So. 2d 505 (1966); Chenoweth v.
Financial Indem. Co., 13 Ariz. App. 313, 476 P.2d 519 (1970); Coe v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 990, 136 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (1977); American Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Davis, 146 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Great Am. Ins. Co.
v. Exum, 123 Ga. App. 515, 181 S.E.2d 704 (1971); Olympia Fields Country Club v.
Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945); Henke v. Iowa Home
Mut. Casualty Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1979); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 426 Mich. 127, 393 N.W.2d 161 (1986); Mendota Elec. Co. v.
New York Indem. Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W. 317 (1926); Fowler v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 153 Mont. 74, 454 P.2d 76 (1969); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security
Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976); Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio
App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971); Kunkel v. United Sec. Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168
N.W.2d 723 (1969); State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 427 S.W.2d 30
(1968); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A. 788 (1936); Tyler
v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970). See also Annotation,
Reliance on, or Rejection of, Advice of Counsel as Factor Affecting Liability in Action
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subsequent entry of a judgment in excess of policy limits. It is not
surprising, however, that such conduct has been held to support a
finding of bad faith. 9 The insurer can hardly argue that it has given
its own interests no more consideration than those of its insured when
it ignores the advice of its own representatives to settle the case.
If the insurer elects to ignore the advice of the attorney hired to
defend the insured against a third-party claim, a finding of bad faith
is particularly likely, since the attorney hired by the insurer is charged
with protecting the interests of both the insurer and the insured. 99
D.

Failure to inform

the insured of settlement offers

and

negotiations
The authorities are unanimous in their view that the insurer has
a duty to convey all settlement offers to the insured and to otherwise
keep the insured informed of the status of all settlement negotiations.200 Failure to do so is a factor indicating bad faith on the part of

a liability insurer. 20

1

Such conduct, according to one authority:

[T]ends to confirm the insurer's guilty knowledge that it wrongfully rejected the settlement offer, rebuts the suggestion that the
insurer considered the offer objectively before rejecting it, and deprives the insured of the opportunity to contribute to the settlement, to inform the insurer of facts showing the wisdom of ac2 02
cepting the offer, or to take other steps to protect its interests.
The basis upon which bad faith liability is most often imposed

Against Insurer for Wrongful Refusal to Settle Claim, 63 A.L.R.3d 725 (1975).
198. See supra note 197.

199. Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1965). Ironically, the question of whether the insurer relied upon the advice of its own
attorney comes to light as a result of the insurer's failure to hire separate legal counsel
to protect the interests of the insured when a conflict arises as a result of a third-party
claim in excess of policy limits. When the same attorney attempts to represent the
interests of both the insurer and the insured, the advice the insurer receives from the
attorney concerning settlement does not fall within the insurer's attorney-client privilege because the attorney providing such advice is also the insured's attorney. See S.
ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:05, at 3-12 n.6.
200. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 1475 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Bohn v. Sentry Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd without
opinion, 868 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1989); Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1984); O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska
1988); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984); Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Copy, 444 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 462 So.
2d 459 (1985); Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984);
Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987); Myers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 146 Vt. 552, 508 A.2d 689 (1986); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd,
235 Va. 136, 366 S.E.2d 93 (1988); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 Wash.
2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986); Warren v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d
381, 361 N.W.2d 724 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
201. See supra note 200.
202. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:09, at 3-21.
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upon an insurer for its failure to inform the insured of offers of settlement is that without knowledge of the offer, the insured is deprived of
the opportunity to contribute to a possible settlement, thus protecting
the insured against the danger of a larger excess judgment."' If the
insured's policy limits are $50,000, for example, and the insurer neglects to inform the insured that the claimant offered to settle the
case for $60,000, the insured is deprived of the opportunity to protect
himself from further liability by contributing $10,000 toward settlement of the case. If a total judgment of $100,000 is thereafter entered,
and the insured can persuade a jury that he would have contributed
$10,000 toward a settlement of the case had he known about the offer
of settlement,2 0 4 the insurer will be held liable for the entire
judgment." 5
The duty of an insurer to keep the insured informed goes beyond
the mere communication of settlement offers. It is generally held that
if the insurer intends to reject a settlement offer and there is any risk
that a potential judgment may exceed policy limits, the insurer must
(1) advise the insured of the risk of an excess judgment; (2) explain
how this may affect the insured's rights; and (3) explain to the insured
that he may secure private counsel to represent his interests in the
litigation.2 0 6 Because failure to do so may result in a finding of bad
faith, 0 7 the insurer's counsel should always communicate in writing
the full facts and circumstances surrounding every offer of settlement,
along with the consequences to the insured of rejecting the offer.
E.

Other factors indicating bad faith

Attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a
policy limits settlement as a condition of accepting an offer to settle
within policy limits have, from the earliest days of third-party bad
faith cases, resulted in a finding of bad faith on the part of the insurer. s The insurer, however, also has a duty to keep the insured
203. See Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982) and
Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967).
204. In such situations, counsel for the insured should always contend that he
would have contributed to the settlement, at least if it can be shown that he was financially able or could have borrowed the funds to do so. For obvious reasons, it is difficult for the insurer to rebut such a contention.
205. Supra note 194.
206. Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982).
207. Id.
208. See Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969);
Springer v. Citizens Casualty Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957); American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933); Covill
v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1978); Board of Education v. Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co., 293 F. Supp. 541 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1969); Brown
& McCabe, Stevedores, Inc. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 232 F. 298 (D. Or.
1915); Chenoweth v. Financial Indem. Co., 13 Ariz. App. 313, 476 P.2d 519 (1970); Coe
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 136 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1977);
Ferris v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 255 Iowa 511, 122 N.W.2d 263 (1963); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967); Commercial

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol26/iss2/7

48

Smith: Understanding the Tort of Third-Party Bad Faith in Wyoming: Weste
1991

THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH IN WYOMING

informed of all settlement offers and to advise the insured of his right
to contribute to an excess offer so that the insured, if he decides it is
in his best interests to do so, may contribute a sum in excess of the
insurer's policy limits in order to settle the case. The insurer must
make certain, therefore, that in advising the insured of his right to
it does
contribute to a potential settlement in excess of policy limits,
209
not convey to the insured the message that he must do so.
Occasionally, the third-party claimant will obtain a judgment in
excess of policy limits and then, to eliminate the time, expense and
uncertainty of an appeal, offer to settle the case within policy limits.
It has been held that the failure of the insurer to accept a "post-judgment" settlement offer is a factor indicating bad faith.21 0 It has also
been held that if the cancellation or nonrenewal of an insured's liability policy is shown to have been in retaliation for the insured's deaccept a policy limits settlement offer, bad
mand that the insurer
211
faith is indicated.
There is authority which holds that the amount of the excess
judgment itself will support a finding of bad faith.2 Whatever the
rule is elsewhere, however, this is clearly not the law in Wyoming. In
Fowler, the court specifically approved a jury instruction which told
the jury not to consider or give any weight to the fact that the employee subsequently recovered a judgment for more than the amount
of the settlement offer. 2 1 3 The question of whether a liability insurer
acted in bad faith in rejecting a policy limits settlement offer, in other
words, must be determined at the time the offer to settle was made
and rejected.21
Finally, some decisions indicate that the insured's failure to demand that his insurer accept a policy limits settlement offer may indicate an absence of bad faith on the part of the insurer. 1 5 The better
rule, however, is that the insured need not do so, particularly when
the insurer usually insists upon the insured's cooperation in the defense of the third-party claim.21 6

Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 426 Mich. 127, 393 N.W.2d 161 (1986); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Netzley v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971); Boling v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935); Kunkel v. United Sec. Ins. Co., 84
S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723 (1969); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481,
1 A.2d 817 (1938); Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300
(1936).
209. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:09, at 3-16.
210. Id. § 3.05, at 3-12.
211. Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960).
212. Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr.
200 (1975).
213. Fowler, 390 P.2d at 606.
214. Id.
215. E.g., Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984).
216. S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3.24, at 3-60.
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ASSIGNMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION

If the third-party claimant obtains a judgment in excess of policy
limits after offering to settle the case within policy limits, it is not
unusual for the insurer to offer its policy limits to the third-party
claimant. As happened in Fowler, the insured may then pay the thirdparty claimant the difference between the amount of the judgment
and the limits of the policy and, having done so, file suit against his
insurer to recover the excess portion of the judgment.2 17
In most cases, however, the insured, whether an individual or a
business entity, will not have sufficient assets to satisfy a large excess
judgment. Indeed, if the insured is insolvent or judgment-proof, he
may have little incentive to pursue a bad faith cause of action against
his insurer unless he sustains significant damage above and beyond
the amount of the judgment for which the insured is personally liable,
or unless the conduct of the insurer was such as to warrant a punitive
damage instruction. Because the third-party claimant (1) cannot force
the insured to pursue a bad faith action against his insurer2" 8 and (2)
may not be able to proceed directly against the liability insurer absent
an assignment,219 the claimant's success in executing upon the excess
judgment will likely depend upon whether he can acquire the insured's bad faith cause of action against the liability insurer. To do so,
the claimant must ordinarily promise that he will look only to the insurer to satisfy the excess judgment. Thus, the insured's second option, at least in most jurisdictions, is to assign his right to collect the
amount of the excess judgment against his insurer to the third-party
claimant in exchange for a covenant not to sue. By assigning the
claim, the insured has shifted his personal liability for the excess judgment to either the liability insurer or the third-party claimant, depending upon whether the claimant can carry his burden of establishing that the insurer rejected the offer in bad faith.2 2
217. The insured may also pursue a bad faith action against the insurer without
discharging the excess portion of the judgment. In that event, there is certainly nothing which precludes the third-party claimant from executing upon the assets of the
insured while the insured is pursing his bad faith action against the insurer. As a practical matter, however, the insured and third-party claimant will often have reached
agreement as to how any recovery on the part of the insured will be divided between
the insured and the third-party claimant. As part of such agreement, the claimant will
often execute a covenant not to sue in favor of the insured. See infra notes 238-248.
218. The third-party claimant may be able to force the insured into bankruptcy,
in which case any claim the insured may have had against his insurer passes by operation of law to the insured's bankruptcy trustee. See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157
Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), even though the judgment against the insured is not yet final. In some cases, the insured's cause of action against the insurer
may represent the only sizeable asset the insured has. In that event, the trustee is
empowered to enter into assignments or to otherwise work out an agreement with the
third-party claimant as to how the action is to be pursued. If the insured's claim was
previously assigned to the injured party, however, the insured's bankruptcy will not
affect the right of the assignee to pursue the bad faith claim.
219. Infra notes 221-224.
220. Provided there is coverage, the third-party claimant will always be able to
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The following section addresses a number of issues concerning the
ability of the insured to assign his third-party bad faith cause of action to the claimant, which counsel for the insurer, the insured and
the third-party claimant should be familiar with.
A. Is the insured's assignment of a bad faith claim to the thirdparty claimant recognized in Wyoming?
In most jurisdictions.. a third-party claimant cannot bring suit
directly against the insurer to collect a judgment in excess of policy
limits absent a statutory cause of action,222 a policy provision authorizing such a suit,2 ' or an assignment from the insured of the insured's
cause of action against the insurer.224 There is no statutory cause of
action in Wyoming permitting such a suit,22 nor is a third-party
attach the policy limits of the liability insurer in partial satisfaction of the judgment.
Thus, where the judgment in question does not significantly exceed the insured's policy limits, the claimant may not be interested in pursuing anyone but the insured.
221. See Annotation, Right of Injured Person Recovering Excess Judgment
Against Insured to Maintain Action Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure
to Settle Claim, 63 A.L.R.3d 677 (1975).
222. E.g., Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 287 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn.
1968); Davis v. National Grange Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1968); Trask v.
Iowa Kemper Mut. Ins. Co., 248 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1976).
223. E.g., Cue v. Casualty Corp. of Am., 537 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975);
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 23 Wash. App. 527, 597 P.2d 932 (1979).
224. E.g., Clement v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 1545
(11th Cir. 1986); Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1973); Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1969); Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co.,.
517 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Smith v. Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661
(E.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969); General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp. v. Little, 102 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690 (1968); Murphy v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584 (1976); Kennedy v. Kiss, 89 Ill.
App. 3d 890, 412 N.E.2d 624 (1980); DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85,
449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983); Lisiewski v. Countrywide Ins. Co., 75 Mich. App. 631, 255
N.W.2d 714 (1977); Lange v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881
(1971); Fredericks v. Home Indem. Co., 101 A.D.2d 614, 474 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1984); Kriz
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, 600 P.2d 496 (1979); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 23 Wash.
App. 527, 597 P.2d 932 (1979).
225. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming in Julian v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 1530 (1988), held that the Wyoming Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act does not create a private right of action on the part of
third-party claimants against liability insurers. As stated by the court:
As with acts in other states, Wyoming penalizes unfair claims settlement
practices that are committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice. As such, "it does not readily lend itself to enforcement
by a private cause of action arising from a single claim." Second, the Wyoming
Insurance Commissioner has power to examine and inquire into violations of the
Insurance Code, enforce the Insurance Code with impartiality, execute the duties
imposed upon him by the Insurance Code, and has the powers and authority expressly conferred upon him by or reasonably implied from this code. Finally, as
illustrated by Wyo. STAT. §26-15-124(c), the Wyoming Legislature knows how to
expressly create a private right of action if it chooses to do so. Having reviewed
WYo STAT. §26-13-124... this court cannot conclude that the legislature intended
to create a private right of action under this section.
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claimant in Wyoming likely to succeed in bringing a direct suit
against a liability insurer as a judgment creditor,"' a third-party beneficiary, 227 or as a garnishor, at least prior to the time the insured
22 has
liquidated the debt through his own action against the insurer.
Although there is no direct authority in Wyoming, 2 9 virtually all
courts have allowed the insured to assign his right of recovery against
the insurer for the wrongful refusal to settle a claim in excess of policy
limits,2 3 even though the policy of insurance may contain a provision

Id. at 1533. The reasons set forth in the above opinion are persuasive and, as a result, it is
not likely that such a cause of action would be recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
226. See A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 9.13. See also Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126
Ariz. 258, 614 P.2d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Murphy v. Clancy, 83 111. App. 3d 779,
404 N.E.2d 287 (1980); Cue v. Casualty Corp. of Am., 537 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App.
1975); Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police, Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984).
Courts holding that a third-party claimant cannot sue in the capacity of a judgment creditor reason that it is not appropriate to resolve the issue of bad faith in a
garnishment proceeding. See, e.g., Linder v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d
412 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
227. Only Florida has allowed such an action under a third-party beneficiary theory, e.g., Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Guitierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980).
228. The majority of jurisdictions reject the argument that a third party may litigate under statutes permitting a creditor to bring a direct cause of action to garnish a
debt owed to the creditor's debtor on the ground that the third party may not bring an
action against the insurer until the insured has liquidated the debt through his own
action against the insurer. See Rowe v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 421 F.2d
937 (4th Cir. 1970); Ring v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 147 Ariz. 33, 708 P.2d 457
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Steen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 157 Colo. 99, 401 P.2d 254
(1965); Stevenson v. Samkow, 142 Ill. App. 3d 293, 491 N.E.2d 1318 (1986); Linder v.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 950
(1972); Pringle v. Robertson, 258 Or. 394, 483 P.2d 814 (1971); Cook v. Superior Ins.
Co., 476 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d
376 (1957); Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash. 2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960).
Note that in Wyoming, a prejudgment writ of garnishment can be obtained by a
judgment creditor anytime after a complaint is filed, but before a judgment is obtained, against the defendant. See Wvo. STAT. § 1-15-401(b) (1977).
229. The issue of whether a bad faith claim is assignable has not arisen in Wyoming. However, assignments in other contexts have been recognized, e.g., In re Boyd's
Estate, 606 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1980) (an assignment is an act or expression of intention
by which one person causes to transfer, set over or vest in another a right or property
or interest therein).
230. See D WALL, supra note 3, § 7.02, at 246 ("Every jurisdiction in which the
courts have addressed the question allows the insured to assign its right to sue the
liability carrier for bad faith to a third-party claimant."). Tennessee, however, appears
to be an exception. See Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d
914 (1964). See also Annotation, Assignabililty of Insured's Right to Recover Over
Against Liability Insurer for Rejection of Settlement Offer, 12 AL.R.3d 1158 (1967).

The only time a question may arise is if a court views a cause of action based on a
failure to settle as sounding solely in tort, e.g., Baker v. Auger, 709 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir.
1983), where the court held that a bad faith claim, being in the nature of an action for
fraud, was not assignable. Most of the cases which have addressed the issue, however,
have held that a claim for a bad faith refusal to settle, although sounding in tort, is
assignable. See Clement v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 1545
(l1th Cir. 1986); Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1979); Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973); Smith v.
Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.
1969); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d
690 (1968); Woolett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 77 Cal. App. 3d 619, 143 Cal.
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directly prohibiting assignments.28 ' Given the recognition which the
vast majority of courts have accorded to the insured's right to assign
his bad faith cause of action to a third-party claimant, there certainly
is no reason to believe that the Wyoming Supreme Court would prevent the insured from assigning his bad faith cause of action to a
third-party claimant if the issue were to come before it.2 3'
B. What defenses can be asserted against the assignee who prosecutes a bad faith claim against the insurer?
According to ordinary principles of contract law, the third-party
claimant takes the assignment subject to any defenses which the insurer could have otherwise asserted against the insured had the insured himself brought suit against the insurer for bad faith.28 3 Where
the claim assigned is the insurer's violation of its duty to settle and
the question of coverage is not at issue, this means that proof of the
insurer's good faith will negate the assignee's claim against the insurer
for the excess judgment." 4

Rptr. 799 (1978); Bracato v. Prairie State Farmers' Ins. Ass'n, 166 Ill. App. 3d 986, 520
N.E.2d 1200 (1988); Dimarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 449 N.E.2d 1189
(1983); Lisiewski v. Countrywide Ins. Co., 75 Mich. App. 631, 255 N.W.2d 714 (1977);
Lange v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971); Fredericks v.
Home Indem. Co., 101 A.D.2d 614 474 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1984); Kriz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, 600 P.2d 495 (1979); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 23 Wash. App. 527, 597 P.2d
932 (1979).
231. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584
(1976).
232. The policy reasons, moreover, for allowing the assignment of third-party bad
faith claims are sound. As the court stated in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d
475, 485 (5th Cir. 1969):
There are strong policy considerations in favor of approving assignment of failureto-settle claims to the injured claimant. A holding to the contrary would leave
many judgment creditors without recourse. The claimant awarded damages may
be left with a judgment-proof debtor whose only valuable asset is his cause of
action against his insurer. It is unlikely that such an insured would undertake a
complex and expensive suit against the insurer offering him no direct benefits.
This would leave the insured party without recourse for his damages and would
allow insurance companies to play fast and loose with claims against their less
affluent policyholders. Here, assignability would benefit the assignor as well as the
assignee to the extent that it diminished the wage garnishment to which he would
be subjected. The policy reason against permitting an assignment of the claim is
that it might encourage fraud and collusion between the insured and the injured
claimant. This reasoning is inapplicable if, as in this case, the insurer has already
rejected the settlement.
233. See KORNBLUM, supra note 16, § 7:215, at 7-53. See also Ceresino v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 215 Cal. App. 3d 814, 264 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1989) and Jones v. Central States Inv.
Co., 654 P.2d 727 (Wyo. 1982), where the court held that the assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor and receives such right, title and interest as is possessed by the
assignor and which the parties make the subject of the contract.
234. As stated in Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 258,
792 P.2d 719, 721 (1990):
The type of claim is not determined by the identity of the party bringing the bad
faith action against the insurer. For example, a third party action might be
brought by the insured in the event that he is subjected to excess liability by
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The rule as to the assignability of bad faith claims applies with
equal force where the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend 235 or incorrectly asserts a coverage defense 23 6 against its insured. Where the assignee has asserted a bad faith claim against the insurer for its wrongful failure to settle and the insurer is claiming that it had no duty to
defend or that the claim does not fall within the coverage of the policy, the assignee need only prove that the claim falls within the coverage of the policy.23 7 If the assignee fails to meet his burden of proof,
he receives no recovery from the insurer beyond policy limits.
The burden of proof which the third-party assignee must carry in
order to collect a judgment in excess of policy limits will obviously
influence the claimant's willingness to execute an assignment with the
insured. Unless the claimant is relatively certain that he can establish
the bad faith of the liability insurer, he is likely to accept an assignment only from an insolvent or judgment proof insured.
C. Will the third-party claimant/assignee be allowed to collect an
excess judgment from the insurer if he executes a covenant not to
sue or releases the insured from liability?
As a practical matter, the insured will not likely assign his cause
of action for bad faith unless the third-party claimant promises not to
attempt collection of the excess judgment from the insured. Absent a
covenant not to sue, there is little incentive for the insured to relinquish his claim against his insurer, because the third-party claimant
who unsuccessfully asserts a third-party bad faith claim against the
insurer may, years later, look back to the insured for satisfaction of
the excess judgment. If the purpose for allowing the insured to assign
reason of the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle. In that event, the standards
applicable to third-party claims would govern the action, although it was brought
by the insured, rather than a third-party assignee.
235. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
236. If, for example, the insurer assumes the defense of a third-party claim subject to a reservation of rights, the insured can, in many jurisdictions, reject the defense. The insurer then has one of two choices. The insurer can either affirm the policy, defend the suit, and pay any resulting advserse judgment, regardless of the
existence of any policy defenses, or can refuse to defend and take its chances that its
denial of coverage will be validated in a subsequent suit on the policy. See A. WINDT,
supra note 16, § 4.24. In such jurisdictions, the insured can declare a breach of contract, assume control of the defense, and enter into a settlement agreement with the
third-party claimant, e.g., United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olympia
Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990). If the settlement agreement is enforceable
against the insurer by the insured, it can be assigned to the third-party claimant.
Supra, note 230.
237. See Steil v. Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), where the court rejected the insured's argument that he should only have
to establish that there was a potential for coverage in order to recover an excess judgment from the insurer, because the insurer's breach of the duty to defend led to the
excess judgment being entered against the insured. The court held that a determination of whether the insurer wrongfully refused to defend was necessary only to determine whether the insurer could rely on its "no-action" clause.
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his bad faith claim is to be meaningfully served, therefore, the thirdparty claimant must be able to promise the
insured that the claimant
23 s
will look only to the insurer for recovery.
In several cases, however, liability insurers have argued that the
assignee should not be allowed to collect an excess judgment from the
insurer if the claimant, by executing a covenant not to sue, has effectively released the insured from all liability for the judgment.2 39 Because all obligations to pay on the part of the insurer are predicated
upon the insured's liability to the claimant,4 0 in other words, insurers

have argued that they cannot be held accountable to the assignee
when the insured has been discharged
from liability by the assignee
24
without making any payment.

1

With some notable exceptions,24 this argument has been rejected
by most of the courts which have considered the issue.2 43 In Gray v.
238. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 7:18, at 7-30.
239. In Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
the insurer's "metaphysical contention" was phrased by the court as follows: "That
brings us to question whether or not the assignment and release were self-contradicting. According to the insurance company, the release nullified the assignment of
the claim because the release extinguished the basis for the assignment. If so, that
which Speed assigned to Gray was worthless upon transfer."
240. Most liability policies require the insurer to pay only as to amounts the insured is "legally obligated to pay." S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 7:18, at 7-29.
241. Steil v. Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
242. Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Ins., 755 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1985); Bendall
v. White, 511 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ala. 1981); American Casualty Co. v. Griffith, 107 Ga.
App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549 (1963); Huffman v. Peerless Ins. Co., 17 N.C. App. 292, 193
S.E.2d 773, cert. denied, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973); and Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262 (1973).
One of the few cases to discuss the issue in the context of a settlement agreement
has held that neither the insured nor his assignee can enforce a settlement agreement
in excess of policy limits where the insured does not face at least the potential of
personal liability. Thus, in National Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Ill., 673 F. Supp.
267, 274-75 (N.D. Ill. 1987), the court held:
At several points in the preceding analysis this opinion has stressed the need for
the insured to be at risk for the settlement amount in excess of the policy limits
before it can seek to thrust that risk onto its insurer. That after all is the factor
that builds into the equation the elements of the settlement's reasonableness and
the insured's bona fides-that at-risk requirement provides the equivalent of an
adversary litigation that produces a judgment in excess of the policy limits. If the
insured is speculating only with the insurer's dollars-a sort of 'Heads I win, tails
I lose nothing'-there is no rational limit imposed on the putative settlement.
243. E.g., Steedly v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 416 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1969)
(assignment/release did not free insurer from liability; if insured "had satisfied judgment by making full payment ... in return for the release, [the insurer] agrees that he
could have then brought an action against it or have assigned this right"); Zander v.
Casualty Ins. Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 793, 66 Cal. Rptr. 561, 568 (1968) (settlement with
insured does not release insurer because to do so penalizes insured for attempt to minimize damages); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401,
404 (1964) (assignment of chose of action in exchange for release from liability before
judgment entered against insured not void against public policy because assignment's
value is determined by bad faith of insurer); LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 87 Ill.
App. 3d 446, 408 N.E.2d 928 (1980) (agreement not to collect against insured given in
exchange for assignment of rights against insurer does not evidence collusion); Metcalf
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Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co., " one of the more recent cases
to discuss the issue, the court explained why the contentions of the
insurer had little merit:
[W]e see no reason why, under D.C. and North Carolina law, we
should not construe the assignment and release to give full effect
to its terms. After all, if the release of [the insured] extinguished
the claim [the insured] had against the insurance company simultaneously with the assignment of the claim, that would also be
true of that part of the claim [the insured] had against the insurance company within the policy limits. As appellee points out, appellant's argument reduces to an absurd conclusion: if the insured
were to have paid the judgment in full and obtained a release
from the injured party, he would have no right to proceed against
the insurer for indemnification. We think appellant's self-destruct
interpretation of the document can only be adopted for policy
reasons quite apart from appropriate legal methods of document
construction ....2,5

The practitioner should note that substantive differences between
a release and covenant not to sue still persist. "Covenants not to execute are different than releases, as the legal liability remains in force
against those who have covenants, whereas a release represents total
freedom from liability." 48 Although in general the courts have not
drawn this distinction in upholding assignments which transfer the
insured's bad faith claim to the third-party claimant, 4 7 it may, nonetheless, be prudent for the third-party claimant to always execute a
covenant not to sue rather than an outright release of liability in acquiring the insured's right to proceed against the insurer. 248

v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471, 475-76 (1964) (rejecting insurer's contention that consent judgment created no legal obligation to pay).
See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Paynter, 122 Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948 (1979);
Steil v. Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Bishop v. Crowder, 101 Ill. App. 3d 933, 428 N.E.2d 1021 (1981); American Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kivela, 408 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. App. 1980); Miller v. Shugart, 316
N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982) Griggs v. Bertram, 8 N.J. 347, 443 A.2d 163 (1982).
244. 871 F.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79
(Kan. 1990).
245. The "policy reasons" referred to by the court rest upon the concern that the
use of covenants not to execute will impart a collusive character to a personal injury
suit. These arguments have been specifically rejected in Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966) and Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d
788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
246. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1133 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
247. Id.
248. Counsel may also note the procedure used in Bishop v. Crowther, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 933, 428 N.E.2d 1021 (1981) and Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 443 A.2d 163
(1982). In those cases, the settlement agreement provided that the injured party could
not execute against any of the insured's assets except for his or her claim against the
insurer. Under this type of agreement, it could be argued that the insured is still legally obligated to the injured party and, if so, the insurer is liable to the assignee for
the excess judgment.
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What rights can be assigned?

It is generally held that tort damages which are personal to the
insured, such as a claim for emotional distress2 49 or damage to the
insured's credit reputation, are not assignable in a third-party bad
faith action.2 50 The jurisdictions are split, however, on the issue of
whether the insured's punitive damage claim is assignable, with the
majority view apparently favoring assignability. 251
Because of the general prohibitions against splitting causes of action, it has been held that the insured's assignment of his entire bad
faith claim constitutes a waiver of any claims which were not assignable.2 " To avoid this problem, the insured who wants to preserve his
tort claims or punitive damage claims against the insurer must (1) execute a partial assignment and (2) join with the third-party claimant
as a party in the latter's bad faith action against the insurer.2 53 This
procedure permits recovery of damages which are deemed personal to
the insured, along with the amount of the excess judgment by the
third-party claimant.2 5 Alternatively, the insured may bring suit in
his name only for all damages, including the judgment in excess of
policy limits, and simply agree in advance to pay part of his recovery
to the third-party claimant.2 55
E. Can the parties to the action enter into a settlement agreement
following breach of the insurer's duty to settle and then enforce the
agreement against the insurer?
Following an insurer's breach of its duty to settle, both the thirdparty claimant and the insured may have reasons to enter into a settlement agreement, which the claimant would thereafter attempt to
enforce against the insurer by way of assignment. By settling the case,
the third-party claimant avoids a trial where he would have to carry
the burden of proving liability and damages. The insured, on the
other hand, may reduce his overall exposure to the claimant by entering into a settlement agreement and spare himself the time, expense
and emotional turmoil of an adversary proceeding. Where he is not
being defended by his insurer, moreover, he may save the costs of as249. See Cuson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 735 F. Supp. 966 (D. Haw. 1990), and
Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584 (1976).
250. See generally Annotation, Assignability of Proceeds of Claim for Personal
Injury or Death, 33 A.L.R.4th 82 (1984).

251. Compare Cuson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 735 F. Supp. 966 (D. Haw. 1990)
and Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 780 P.2d 423, 427 (Ariz. App. 1989)
rev'd on other grounds, 792 P.2d 719 (Ariz. 1990) with Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17
Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584 (1976).
252. Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971).
253. This procedure was specifically approved in Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
254. Id.
255. Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971).
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suming his own defense."'
In spite of contentions on the part of insurers that an unauthorized settlement agreement violates the "no-action" clauses typically
found in liability insurance policies,""7 the courts have universally allowed the insured to enter into a settlement agreement with the
claimant following the insurer's violation of its duty to settle.256 The
right of the insured to do so has been held to be indistinguishable
from the insured's right to control his own defense, and hence settle
him, where the insurer wrongfully refuses
all claims asserted against
2 9
to defend its insured.
Insurers have also argued to no avail that the third-party bad
faith cause of action can arise only after a judgment in excess of policy
limits has been entered against the insured. 60 It is now clear that an
actual judgment in excess of policy limits is not a prerequisite to the
third-party bad faith cause of action. As a result, following breach of
the insurer's duty to settle, the insured has the right to enforce a settlement agreement against the insurer,'"' provided that it is reasonable and entered into in good faith2 2 and the potential judgment ex256. In many cases, the insured, if he believes that his insurer has wrongfully refused to defend him against a third-party claim, will simply allow a default judgment
to be entered against him. Under the theory that the insured must mitigate his damages where it is reasonable to do so, however, some jurisdictions require that the insured hire his own attorney and defend against the third-party claim, particularly if
the insured has the financial resources to do so. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 4:07
and A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 4.16.
257. See Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of "No-Consent-to-Settlement" Exclusion Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policy, 18 A.L.R.4th 246, 266-71
(1982).
A typical "no-action" clause reads as follows:
No legal action may be brought against us until:
1. We agree in writing that the "insured" has an obligation to pay; or
2. The amount of that obligation has been finally determined by judgment after
trial.
KEETON & WInIsS, supra note 12, APP. H(2), at 1128.
258. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). As
stated by S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3.26, at 3-63 to 3-64:
If the insurer rejects a settlement offer in bad faith, it breaches a duty which
is as much a part of the contract as if it were written out and forfeits its right to
demand that the insured comply with the prohibitory provisions of the policy,
such as that prohibiting the insured from settling with the third party.
259. National Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Ill., 673 F. Supp. 267, 273 (N.D. Ill.
1987) ("Illinois law allows an insured to effect a reasonable settlement on its own after
the insurer has breached the duty to settle, just as after the insurer has breached the
duty to defend").
260. Supra note 257. See also 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
4712, at 431 (1979).
261. As stated by National Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Ill., 673 F. Supp. 267,
274 (N.D. 111.1987), "[A1ll of the courts that have considered the question have allowed insureds (1) to effect reasonable settlements on their own after their insurers
have breached their duty to settle and (2) to enforce those settlements against the
insurers if reasonable and made in good faith."
262. E.g., Wolf v. Maryland Casualty Co., 617 F. Supp. 456, 460 (S.D. Ill. 1985)
(insurer must pay the judgment or reasonable settlement absent collusion or bad faith
by the insured and the injured party).
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ceeds the limits of the policy.

63

As stated by one author:

Following an insurer's breach of its duty to settle, the only condition precedent to a cause of action is damages. There is no logical
reason why those damages must take the form of an excess judgment as opposed to a reasonable settlement in excess of policy
limits. In fact, to so hold would penalize an insured for merely
acting prudently. The insured, being faced with the potential of
an adverse judgment in excess of policy limits, should not be
forced to ignore advantageous settlement offers on the grounds
that to accept such an offer would deprive
the insured of ex2 4
tracontractual rights against the insurer.

0

There is some older authority for the position that settlement
agreements entered into between the insured and third-party claimant
may be enforced against the insurer only to the extent of the insurer's
policy limits. 266 The argument in favor of restricting the insurer's liability to the extent of its policy limits centers primarily on the danger
of collusion between the insured and third-party claimant.2 6 6 As noted
in National Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Illinois,26 however, such a
rule is unnecessary because incentives exist for the insured not to
enter into an unreasonable settlement agreement with the third-party
claimant:
[Slo long as the insured cannot look to the insurer for that excess
amount without proving the insurer's negligence or bad faith, the
insured has ample incentive to be reasonable in negotiating settlements itself-for it will be out of pocket if it cannot sustain its
burden of proof....
Again, so long as the insurer's breach of its duty to settle is shown
to have deprived the insured of the opportunity for a favorable
settlement, no rational distinction separates the insured's striking
the next best deal it can make from the insured's going to trial
and getting hit with a larger judgment. Either way the insured
has been compelled to accept liability because of the insurer's
negligence or bad faith in rejecting the more favorable settlement.

263. See Merritt v. J.A. Stafford Co., 68 Cal. 2d 619, 68 Cal. Rptr. 447, 440 P.2d

927 (1968). If the potential judgment does not exceed policy limits, the insured has no
fear of personal exposure, and hence no need to protect himself by entering into an
unauthorized settlement agreement.
264. A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 5.16, at 213.
265. Compare, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 72
N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976) with National Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Ill., 673 F.
Supp. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1987) and Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1990).
266. This concern was specifically noted in the recent decision of Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 92 (Kan. 1990). See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co.
of Hartford, 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976), where the court opined: "We do express
concern over the reasonableness of assignment/covenants in which the amount of the
judgment assigned has been determined by agreement of the parties."
267. 673 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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As an additional safeguard against the possibility of fraud or collusion, some courts impose the initial burden of going forward with
evidence that the settlement agreement was reasonable and entered
into in good faith upon the insured.2 6
There is no reason why the right to enforce a settlement agreement in excess of policy limits against the insurer cannot be assigned
to the third-party claimant, in Wyoming or elsewhere. In those jurisdictions where the actual liability of the insured is not a prerequisite
to an insurer's liability for a settlement in excess of policy limits,
moreover, the third-party claimant's covenant not to execute upon the
insured will not destroy the right to collect from the insurer.
Finally, it has been held that the insured, following the insurer's
breach of its duty to settle, has no obligation to notify the insurer that
it has received an offer of settlement from the third-party claimant.269
Similarly, the insured has no obligation to notify the
insurer that he
2 70
intends to assign his cause of action for bad faith.
F. Summation-practical considerations for the insurer, insured,
and third-party claimant
Whenever a third party asserts a claim for damages against an
insured in excess of the insured's policy limits, the insured, insurer
and claimant all have separate interests to protect. The interests of
the insurer require an effort to minimize its liability, if possible, below
the limits of the policy or the offer of settlement made by the thirdparty claimant. The interests of the insured require an effort to avoid
personal liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits. Finally, the
interests of the third-party claimant require an effort to ensure that a
claim for damages in excess of policy limits is fully paid.
The insurer, first of all, should recognize that the ability of the
insured to assign the right to enforce a judgment or settlement agreement in excess of policy limits can only work to its overall disadvantage. Where an assignment is made and the third-party claimant becomes the plaintiff in a bad faith action, a jury will be more inclined
to sympathize with an injured victim than with an insured who has
been accused of wrongdoing. As a practical matter, therefore, the insurer should seriously evaluate the circumstances of the third-party
claimant before denying a settlement offer within policy limits, be268. Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1990); Griggs v. Bertram, 8 N.J. 347, 443
A.2d 163 (1982); and Steil v. Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App. 1984).
269. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 393 So. 2d 552 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 5.06, at 245 ("Courts should
not penalize an insured for failure to perform the idle act of notifying the company
after the company has renounced the contract."). See also S. Ashley, supra note 16, §
3.26, at 3-65.
270. See Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 636
P.2d 32 (1981).
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cause the chances are excellent that in the event an action is filed
against the insurer for third-party bad faith, the third-party claimant
will be the plaintiff.
When a third-party claimant is seeking damages against the insured in excess of policy limits and the insurer subsequently rejects an
offer by the claimant to settle the claim within policy limits, the insured has several choices to make. If the insured is not being defended
because of a coverage dispute and clearly has the resources to defend
himself, he must first decide whether to hire his own attorney to defend the third-party claim. If the insured has the financial resources
to hire an attorney, but not respond to a potentially large judgment in
excess of policy limits, he may best be advised to do so."' His counsel
may then determine whether to defend the claim on its merits or, if
the third-party claimant is amenable, to settle the claim for a reasonable sum and assign his claim for bad faith to the claimant in exchange
for a covenant not to sue. Prior to doing so, however, the insured
should always make a policy limits offer, if circumstances otherwise
warrant, because the failure to do so may prevent the insured or his
assignee from asserting a claim in excess of policy limits against the
insured. 272 By assigning the bad faith claim in exchange for a covenant
not to sue, the insured has not only eliminated any personal exposure
he may otherwise have above the limits of his policy, but he has also
transferred the burden of proving coverage to the third-party claimant.2 s At the same time, moreover, the insured may reserve the right
to assert a claim for personal damages against the insurer and join the
third-party claimant in a bad faith suit against the insurer. If the insured does not have the financial resources to defend himself or is
otherwise insolvent or judgment-proof, it is not likely that he will

271. The authorities are split on the issue of whether the insured must hire his
own counsel if the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend him. Compare LaRotunda v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 87 111.App. 3d 446, 408 N.E.2d 928 (1980) and Cornwell v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 42 A.D.2d 127, 346 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1973) with Western Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1968) and Rensi v. Langston, 499 F. Supp. 720
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
According to one authority, the majority, and better, rule is that the insured has
no such duty:
Having contracted to have the insurer defend, the insured should be able to do
nothing more than cooperate with the insurer when a suit encompassed by the
policy is filed. The insured did not impliedly covenant to attempt to minimize the
insurer's exposure in the event of the insurer breaching its duty to defend, and,
for policy reasons, the duty to mitigate damages should not be applicable. Having
itself refused to take any action in an effort to minimize its potential exposure in
the pending lawsuit, the insurer cannot expect the insured to take such action.
A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 4.16, at 167-68.
In spite of the above, Wyoming counsel should not automatically assume that the insured will be excused from hiring counsel to defend himself, provided he has the financial
resources to do so. The general duty to mitigate damages, where it is reasonable to do so, is
still observed in Wyoming. See WYOMING CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs § 4.08 (rev. ed.
1988).
272. Supra note 60.
273. See supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991

61

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 26 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 7
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVI

have to seek out the third-party claimant in order to obtain a covenant not to sue, because the ability of the claimant to collect any sum
in excess of policy limits may depend upon the claimant acquiring the
insured's bad faith cause of action against the insured. In that event,
the insured may be in a favorable position to negotiate a division of
any potential recovery with the claimant.
Where the insured is being defended by the insurer at such time
as the insurer rejects a policy limits settlement offer, the insured must
decide whether to take control of his own defense, a decision which
must usually be made by determining whether the insurer has violated its duty to settle. In the event the insurer's actions in rejecting
the settlement offer appear reasonable under the circumstances, the
insured is best advised to permit the insurer to continue the defense
of the action. If it should be determined that the insurer has not violated its duty to settle and the insured takes control of the defense,
the insured may be held to have violated policy provisions giving the
insurer the exclusive right to defend or settle the case. In that event,
the insured will be personally liable for his own attorney's fees, if any,
and any sum of money above policy limits that the third-party claimant may be entitled to collect from him.2" 4 If, however, the insured is
confident that the insurer has violated its duty to settle, the insured
with assets to protect may want to reject the defense provided for him
by the insurer in order to attempt settlement of the case within the
limits of the policy or, at the very least, minimize his liability to the
third-party claimant for a sum in excess of policy limits. In the event
the insured is not able to obtain a covenant not to sue from the claimant for some reason, on the other hand, the insured will remain personally liable for any sum he is liable to pay in excess of policy limits
in the event his insurer is found not to have acted in bad faith.
For the above reasons, there are few advantages to the insured in
asserting his own bad faith claim against the insurer, at least where
the insured has some assets to protect and the option of obtaining a
covenant not to sue from the claimant. As a result, the insured should
attempt to eliminate his personal exposure for damages in excess of
policy limits whenever possible and, at the same time, reserve the
right to assert any personal damage claims he may have against the
insurer.
Finally, where damages are claimed in excess of policy limits, the
274. If the insured breaches his contract of insurance, is the insurer liable to pay
policy benefits to the third-party claimant? Although no cases have been found in
which this issue was raised, it is doubtful that the insurer would be able to assert the
insured's breach of contract as a defense to a third-party claimant's garnishment action. It has been held, moreover, that the plaintiff's failure to abide by policy provisions does not constitute a defense to an action for bad faith, e.g., Viles v. Security
Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990). If the insurer has no basis for withholding
policy limits other than the fact that the insured erroneously concluded that the insurer violated its duty to settle, the insurer would be liable for payment of under a bad
faith theory.
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interests of the third-party claimant will always require a thorough
investigation of the insured's financial status. If it appears that the
insured does not have the present or future ability to pay a claim
within policy limits, the claimant should always extend an offer to settle within policy limits to the insured. If the insurer accepts, then the
claimant is assured of receiving some compensation for his injuries. If
the insurer does not act in good faith in rejecting the offer, then it will
always be in the best interests of the claimant to execute a covenant
not to sue the insured in exchange for an assignment of the insured's
possible bad faith cause of action against the insurer, because the
claimant's ability to satisfy his damage claim will depend upon being
able to proceed against the insurer. If the insured does have the assets
to respond to the claimant's damage claims, however, it will seldom be
to the claimant's advantage to acquire the insured's bad faith cause of
action in exchange for a covenant not to sue.2 75 By asserting the bad
faith claim himself, the claimant will have assumed the burden of establishing that the insurer acted in bad faith by refusing to settle
within policy limits. If he fails, he will not only have expended a considerable sum in costs and perhaps attorney's fees, but he will have
likely bargained away his right to collect the excess judgment from
the insured in order to acquire the assignment. One of the few instances in which the claimant might decide to execute a covenant not
to sue, notwithstanding the assets held by the insured, is where the
insured has an exceptionally strong punitive damage case against the
insurer.
Where the insurer has refused to defend the insured because of
coverage problems, the claimant's interests will generally be better
served by obtaining a default judgment against the insured in order to
avoid any argument by the insurer that the claimant acted collusively
with the insured in establishing damages. Where the insurer does assume the defense of the underlying action and the insured decides to
take control of his own defense following a rejection of a policy limits
offer of settlement, the claimant may desire to enter into a reasonable
settlement agreement with the insured for several reasons. First, the
claimant avoids having to prove liability or damages in the underlying
case against the insured. Second, the claimant may avoid, to some extent, the problem of paying for attorney's fees twice, once in the underlying action and again by asserting the bad faith claim against the
insurer. Finally, settlement of all claims with the insured will speed
up the process of collecting damages in excess of policy limits considerably. If a decision to settle the case is made, the third-party claimant and insured may want to retain an independent "appraiser" to
evaluate damages in order to avoid claims of collusion by the insurer.
275. It may be possible for the claimant to secure the insured's cause of action
without executing a covenant not to sue, particularly where the insured is insolvent or
judgment-proof. The claimant, for example, could agree to withstand the costs of pursuing a bad faith action against the insurer as consideration for the assignment.
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If the claimant's attorney does decide to pursue settlement with
the insured, caution must be exercised. If the insured is still being
represented by counsel furnished by the insurer, ethical considerations may preclude any direct negotiations between the claimant's
the insured without defense counsel's knowledge and
counsel 27and
6
consent.

VI.

DAMAGES

Whether or not the insurer violates its duty to settle, it must always respond with its policy limits if a judgment is subsequently obtained against the insured in excess of policy limits, regardless of
whether the insurer or insured controls the defense at such time as
the judgment is entered. In other words, the liability of the insured to
the third-party claimant, and not the insurer's bad faith, determines
whether 2the
insurer's policy limits are payable to the third-party
77
claimant.
A.

Excess judgments

Where the insurer has violated his duty to settle, all jurisdictions,
including Wyoming,2 7 8 allow the insured or his assignee to recover the
difference between the amount of the excess judgment and the policy
limits of the insurer,2 79 regardless of the theory of recovery upon
276. See WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW 4.2
(1986). See also M. KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH §
7:227.1, at 7-56 (1990).
277. Policy provisions typically provide that policy proceeds are directly payable
to the third-party claimant if the insured is legally liable to the claimant.
278. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964).
279. See Torrez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1982);
Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1979); Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1960); Trimper v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1188 (D.S.C. 1982); Buntin v. Continental Ins. Co., 525 F. Supp.
1077 (D.V.I. 1981); Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224 (D. Kan. 1978); United Services
Auto. Ass'n v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1972); McChristian v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Davis v. National
Grange Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1968); Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v.
Helton, 192 F. Supp. 441, (S.D. Ala. 1961); Brisco v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 72,
643 P.2d 1042 (Ariz. App. 1982); Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 201
Cal. Rptr. 528 (1984); Beck v. Kelly, 323 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds; General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co. v. American Casualty Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition denied, 399 So. 2d 1142
(1981); McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 869, 310 S.E.2d 513 (1984); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (1981); Terrell v. Western Casualty &
Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968); Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins.
Co., 411 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert granted, 427 So. 2d 863 (1983); State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schlossberg, 82 Md. App. 45, 570 A.2d 328 (1990); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976); Dyer v. General Am. Life
Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Reifenstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 A.D.
2d 715, 461 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1983); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 2d 272, 452
N.E.2d 1315 (1983); American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. L.C. Jones Trucking Co., 321
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which the plaintiff proceeds."' 0 Indeed, in most third-party cases, the
amount of the excess judgment will constitute the primary damage
component of the case.28'
Where an actual excess judgment has been entered against the
insured by a court of law, the insurer cannot collaterally attack the
2 82
The
amount of the judgment in a subsequent action for bad faith.
of
amount
and
the
the
insurer
difference between the policy limits of
the excess judgment, in other words, is always recoverable by the insured or his assignee, provided that the insurer acted in bad faith in
rejecting a settlement offer within policy limits.2 8 3 Where the liability
of the insured in excess of policy limits is created by agreement between the insured and the third-party claimant, however, the insurer
may always question whether the amount of the settlement agreement
was reasonable or whether the agreement itself was characterized by
fraud, collusion or bad faith.2 4
B.

Other compensatory damages

The question of whether compensatory damages in addition to
the amount of the excess judgment are recoverable by an insured2'8
from an insurer in a third-party bad faith action is determined, to
some extent, by whether the action is characterized as one sounding in
contract, tort or both. In jurisdictions which classify the cause of action as sounding in tort, all proximately caused damages are recoverable,2 86 whereas in jurisdictions in which the action sounds only in
contract, only those damages which were reasonably foreseeable when
the policy was issued are recoverable by the insured. 28 7 The theory of
P.2d 685 (Okla. 1958); Kriz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 42 Or. App. 339, 600
P.2d 495 (1979); Shearer v. Reed, 286 Pa. Super. 188, 428 A.2d 635 (1981); Kunkel v.
United Sec. Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723 (1969); Myers v. Ambassador Ins.
Co., 146 Vt. 552, 508 A.2d 689 (1986).
280. SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 7.03[2][a], at 7-10 ("[Elven the courts that treat
the insurer's breach of its duty to settle as sounding in contract rather than tort will
permit the insured to recover one very significant item of consequential damages: the
amount of the judgment entered in the third-party action in excess of the policy
limits.").
281. Id. at § 7.05, at 7-35.
282. A. WINDT, supra note 16, § 6.20, at 330-32.
283. Id. The insurer's good faith, quite obviously, is a complete defense to any
action on the part of an insured or his assignee to recover an excess judgment against
the insurer.
284. E.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864
(1976).
285. Supra notes 249-250. Such damages are not recoverable by an assignee of the
insured's cause of action if they are "personal" to the insured.
286. See, e.g., SHERNOFF, supra note 3, § 7.03[3]. See also Atlas Constr. Co. v.
Slater, 746 P.2d 352 (Wyo. 1987).
287. See, e.g., Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich.
1980), and Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576 (N.H. 1978). See also the
discussion contained in White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986),
where the court observed that damage to the insured arising from a foreclosure of a
second mortgage, caused when policy proceeds were withheld from the insured, would
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recovery, therefore, may determine whether an insurer may be held
liable for such damage components as emotional distress, 88 damage to
credit reputation,'2 8 9 lost profits, 29 0 and loss of a business, 9' at least
where such damages were not reasonably within the contemplation
of
292
the insurer at the time the policy of insurance was issued.
There are a few cases,293 including a very recent decision from the
Kansas Supreme Court, which specifically adopt the position that a
liability insurer's bad faith failure to settle gives rise only to a breach
of contract action. In Glenn v. Fleming, " for example, the court held
that a wrongful failure to settle arises from the insurer's contractual
obligation to defend and, accordingly, an action to enforce that obligation is based on breach of contract. In deciding this case, however, the
Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged the confusion it had previously
created by applying a standard of care normally associated with tort
law to a breach of contract:
We have adopted, in our development of the substantive case law,
the principle that the insurer's duties are contractually based and
then approved a tort standard of care for determining when the
contract duty has been breached. Perhaps this contract/tort relationship has contributed to the confusion arising from our efforts
to describe the duty of good faith and to identify the situations
involving bad faith/negligent duty to settle and to defend, From
Bennett v. Conrady, and Bollinger v. Nuss, forward, we have
used 'negligence,' 'due care,' and other tort expressions
to de2 95
scribe the substance of what is a contract duty.

not be recoverable under a breach of contract theory. Since the second mortgage was
executed after the policy was issued, damage arising from the foreclosure could not
have been foreseen by either party to the contract.
288. Compare Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d
173 (1967) with Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576

(1978). See Annotation, Emotional or Mental Distress as Element of Damages for
Liability Insurer's Wrongful Refusal to Settle, 57 A.L.R.4th 801 (1987).
289. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), af/'d,
691 P.2d 1138 (1984).
290. E.g., Salvator v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 156 111.App. 3d 930, 509
N.E.2d 1349 (1987).
291. Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A. v. Milsap, 760 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
292. As stated in one article: "The practical consequence of allowing recovery in
tort is that the parties to the contract are no longer limited by the strict foreseeability
rule for measuring contractual damages. Under tort law, the only significant limitation
on recovery is the necessity of showing plaintiff's damages were 'proximately caused.' "
P. MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILITY: THE LAW OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSUR-

§ 8.03, at 8-10 (3d ed. 1990) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie: Does Bad
Faith Law Raise Questions of Constitutional Dimension?, INS LITIGATION REP. (Oct.
ERS

1985-Feb. 1986)).
293. E.g., Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601,
285 N.E.2d 849 (1972).
294. 799 P.2d 79, 92 (Kan. 1990).
295. Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
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The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, label the cause of action for third-party bad faith as one which sounds in tort.2 6 Even
though Fowler itself does not definitively resolve the question in Wyoming, there can be little doubt about which way the Wyoming Supreme Court would decide the issue if presented. By holding that the
cause of action for first-party bad faith gave rise to an independent
tort in McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., the majority opinion relied upon Fowler, in part, as authority for doing so."'
In Wyoming, therefore, there is every reason to assume that the
insured may recover for emotional distress and other types of economic harm in a third-party bad faith action. Indeed, the only restriction on the type of actual damage that the insured may recover in a
third-party bad faith action, economic or otherwise, is that such damage must have proximately resulted from the bad faith actions of the
insurer.1e It should also be noted that an actual excess judgment may
not be necessary to an award of compensatory damages for the insurer's wrongful failure to settle. If the insurer rejects the offer of settlement in bad faith, and the insured incurs economic damage as a
result, the insurer may be held liable for such damage even though the
case is thereafter settled within policy limits.29
Conceivably, the theory of liability in a third-party case may also
determine the type of damages which an assignee of the insured's bad
faith claim can recover from the insured.300 Since damages for "personal torts" are not assignable, the assignee may want to style his bad
faith action against the insurer as a breach of contract action,"0 ' at
least in cases where the insured does not expressly reserve the right to
pursue certain damages.302 By doing so, the claimant may be able to
recover the insured's pecuniary or economic losses321 Regardless of
296. See S. ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 2:22, at 2-65.
297. As Justice Urbikit noted in McCullough, 789 P.2d at 858:
Wyoming law has a consistent thread running from the 1964 case of Western
Casualty and Surety Co., 390 P.2d 602 involving the third-party situation of a
failure to settle and Arnold, 707 P.2d 161 involving first-party uninsured motorist
coverage, so that recognition of the independent action for the tort of first-party
bad faith would be structurally consistent and could be expected.
298. One case has allowed the cost of inflation as a proximately caused damage.
Leslie Salt Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1981).
299. Larraburu Brothers, Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1979).
300. Supra notes 249-251.
301. There seems to be no reason why the plaintiff in a third-party bad faith action could not plead the action as a breach of contract and, alternatively, as a tort
action at the same time. See, e.g., Larraburu Bros., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1979).
302. The insured, of course, can always give a partial assignment and join in the
action to recover the damages which he does not assign. Supra notes 253-254.
303. As stated in Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 780 P.2d 423, 427
(Ariz. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 792 P.2d 719 (1990):
We must now address the question of what effect the assignment has on the
issue of damages when an insured assigns his claim for bad faith failure to settle
to a third party. The insured gives up all of his claims arising from the bad faith
failure to settle because the cause of action for bad faith cannot be split, and the
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how the action is styled, however, it is well established that an as4
signee cannot recover damages for the insured's emotional distress.0
C.

Punitive damages

The issue of whether punitive damages are recoverable in a thirdparty bad faith action may also depend upon whether the action is
characterized as one sounding in contract or tort, particularly in jurisdictions such as Wyoming, where punitive damages are not recoverable in contract actions absent fraud at the inception of the
contract.30
Since the third-party bad faith action is undoubtedly one which
sounds in tort in Wyoming, there can be little question but that punitive damages are recoverable in a proper case. 06 It is just as clear in
Wyoming, however, that the insured or his assignee is not automatically entitled to a punitive damage instruction simply because bad
faith on the part of the insurer has been proved."' 7 The failure of the
insurer to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured
alone, in other words, does not expose the insurer to liability for punitive damages. In addition to acting in bad faith, the actions of the
insurer must have been committed in a willful and wanton manner." 8
D.

Attorney's fees

In a first-party case, attorney's fees are recoverable in Wyoming if
the refusal to pay policy benefits by an insurer is unreasonable. Wyoming Statutes section 26-15-124(c) provides:
In any actions or proceedings commenced against any insurance company on any insurance policy or certificate of any type
or kind of insurance, or in any case where an insurer is obligated
by a liability insurance to defend any suit or claim or pay any
judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is determined that
the company refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by
the policy and that the refusal to pay is unreasonable or without
cause, any court in which judgment is rendered for a claimant
may also award a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee and interest
at ten percent (10%) per year.
assignee is the only person who can assert the claim. The third party's claim is in
reality the insured's claim, but the third party cannot recover damages personally
suffered by the insured such as pain and suffering, embarrassment, mental
anguish and humiliation. The assignee can only recover the insured's pecuniary
losses.

304.
305.
1985).
306.
307.
308.

Supra note 233.
Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo.
See Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987).
McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860-61.
Id.
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It seems clear, however, that this statute does not allow for the
recovery of attorney's fees in third-party bad faith cases because the
statute provides for such fees only where the insurer refuses to pay
the full amount of a loss "covered by the policy." Since excess judgments are not "covered by the policy," the statute does not permit an
award of attorney's fees, even where the excess judgment was caused
by the insurer's refusal to defend. If the insurer unreasonably refuses
to tender its policy limits after a third-party judgment is entered
against its insured because of a coverage dispute or some other reason,
the result would be different, whether the judgment obtained is in excess of policy limits or not. Th6 question then becomes one of whether
the actions of the insurer in refusing to pay the claim up to the limits
of its policy were reasonable.
Unless provided by statute or contract, the recovery of attorney's
fees in Wyoming is generally prohibited." 9 It should be noted that
this rule would not apply in the event that the insurer's violation of
its duty to defend or settle causes the insured to incur attorney's fees
in connection with the underlying action.3 10 Neither would there be a
prohibition on the recovery of attorney's fees incurred as a result of
entering into a settlement agreement with the third-party claimant
31
following the insurer's violation of its duty to settle or defend. '
VII.

CONCLUSION

It has been the rather ambitious goal of this article to review the
third-party bad faith cause of action in Wyoming. The author has attempted to do so by integrating a discussion of Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Fowler with developments in the area of third-party bad
faith in other jurisdictions. A conscious effort has also been made to
discuss the practical considerations and different interests which come
into play for insurers, insureds and third-party claimants when a
third-party bad faith claim arises.
It may be appropriate at this point to mention that the danger to
of incurring personal liability in excess of policy limits,
insured
the
and the corresponding likelihood of a bad faith action being asserted
against a liability insurer, is one which in most cases lies within the
control of either party to the insurance contract. In the vast majority
of cases, the insured who is concerned that he may be held personally
liable for what otherwise amounts to an insured loss can simply
purchase higher policy limits,3 12 particularly with the current prolifer309. Werner v. American Sur. Co. of N.Y., 423 P.2d 86 (Wyo. 1967).
310. E.g., Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116, 419
P.2d 180 (1966), and Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673 (1972).
311. Supra note 258.
312. With automobile insurance, particularly, it is rather naive to assume that everyone has the ability to purchase adequate policy limits. Indeed, a significant percentage of all Wyoming drivers have no insurance at all. In an article written by the author
of this article in 1976, twenty-five percent of all Wyoming drivers were estimated to
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ation of excess and umbrella policies on the market. Similarly, the insurer who is concerned about the possibility of being held liable for a
judgment in excess of policy limits because it cannot accept all, or
even most, policy limit offers can avoid selling liability policies with
unusually low limits, an example being the automobile liability coverage with policy limits which do not exceed the minimum limits mandated by the Wyoming Safety Responsibility Act.3 1 3 The greatest danger of an insured incurring personal liability as a result of a thirdparty claim or, alternatively, the greatest likelihood of a liability insurer incurring liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits, occurs where an insured is willing to buy, and the insurer willingly sells,
a low-limits policy.
Finally, the legal debate concerning the question of who should
bear the cost of judgments and settlements in excess of policy limits
when the insurer had an opportunity to settle the case within policy
limits will continue to rage. Given the fact that insurers will continue
to consider their own interests when determining whether to accept
offers of settlement within policy limits, as they must, judgments in
excess of policy limits will continue to be a fact of life, as will the
third-party bad faith suits that will inevitably follow. Liability insurers in Wyoming and elsewhere, therefore, should give very serious
consideration to the development of a contractual remedy to address
the problems created by the decisions liability insurers must make in
responding to settlement offers. As stated by one of the very few authorities to advance this notion:
The cause of action for bad faith exists in third-party cases
because the silence of insurance policies regarding the insurer's
duties in responding to policy limits settlement offers forced the
courts to fill this gap and define the insurer's responsibilities. Insurers could avoid the dilemma they face in responding to settlement offers by adding provisions to their liability policies expressly defining the insurer's duties and limiting the insurer's
exposure to liability when it rejects a policy limits settlement offer. But insurers seem to act as if their policies, once printed, are
carved in stone and cannot be changed no matter how great the

have no liability insurance. Smith, The Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act: A Regulatory Reconciliation of Mandated Coverages with the Standard Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv. 213, 213 n.2 (1976). A significant percentage

of drivers who do have insurance purchase low-limit policies (1) because of cost; (2)
because of a lack of assets to protect; (3) because certain rating factors, such as the
insured's driving record, leave no other alternative. With other types of liability insurance, however, there are fewer reasons to be underinsured, particularly among business
insureds and professionals.
313. WYo. STAT. § 31-9-405(b)(ii) (1977). In Wyoming, motorists are required to
maintain liability insurance within minimum limits of $25,000 because of bodily injury
to or death of any one person in and one accident; $50,000 because of bodily injury to
or death of two or more persons in any one accident; and $20,000 because of injury to
or destruction of property of others in any one accident.
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liability the company incurs.""4
By creating a contractual remedy to redress the claims of insureds whose interests are not adequately considered by insurers in
responding to settlement offers, insurers could limit the damages they
would otherwise be held liable for, and at the same time provide for
unlimited discretion in accepting or rejecting settlement offers. In return, insureds who become personally liable for an excess judgment
because of the insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits would be
compensated without regard to the bad faith or good faith of the insurer. Because the enforceability of such a provision depends only on
(1) its lack of ambiguity 1 8 and (2) compliance with "public policy," '
innovative liability insurers could virtually eliminate their exposure to
damages for bad faith and punitive damage awards and perhaps even
lower the overall cost of liability insurance. 1 7 The alternative for insurers is the continued prospect of liability for judgments in excess of
policy limits, consequential damages which emanate therefrom and,
where appropriate, punitive damage awards.

314. S.ASHLEY, supra note 16, § 3:28, at 3-69.
315. Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1979).
316. See, e.g., Tate v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1982)
(contract which is contrary to public policy will not be recognized by the court, and the
parties to the contract will be left as the court finds them).
317. Premium savings should result from a contractual provision of this type for
several reasons. First, insurers would realize a substantial reduction in litigation costs
in third-party bad faith lawsuits. Second, punitive damage awards would be more infrequent. Third, the certainty of limited contract damages would replace the uncertainty of large bad faith damage awards.
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